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EDITOR’S WORDS 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy has moved toward its first anniversary since the journal 
made its debut one year ago and now at the moment of starting its second volume 
after successfully completing the open-access publication of the first volume. The 
journal was established around the end of the first decade of the 21th century during 
which comparative philosophy, as understood and practiced in a philosophically 
interesting way, underwent significant development in its identity, coverage and 
mission. Comparative philosophy is no more limited to the East-West comparative 
dialogue only; it is neither restricted to the comparative examination of 
culture/region-associated traditions nor stops at the purely historical description of 
apparent similarities and differences, but penetrates deeper and wider philosophically. 
Comparative philosophy, instead of being a local subfield of philosophy, has become 
one exciting general front of philosophical exploration that is primarily concerned 
with how distinct approaches from different philosophical traditions (generally 
covering both culture/region-associated and style/orientation-associated philosophical 
traditions) can learn from each other and constructively engage each other to jointly 
contribute to the development of contemporary philosophy on a series of issues or 
topics of philosophical significance, which can be jointly concerned through 
appropriate philosophical interpretation and/or from a broader philosophical vantage 
point. This journal is to provide a forum for such thoroughly open-minded while 
constructive-engaging exploration.  
  The contents of the past volume and the current issue of the journal have 
illustrated well the foregoing features of comparative philosophy and can serve as a 
good showcase of its width and depth. The reader can see such cross-tradition 
philosophical exploration effectively and engagingly resorts to various 
philosophically interesting and relevant resources and approaches from different 
traditions (involving not merely Chinese, Indian and Western traditions but also 
Africana, Islamic and Latin American traditions, and also addressing different 
styles/orientations of doing philosophy such as what is shown in the analytic-
‘Continental’ divide); the addressed issues extensively include those in metaphysics, 
epistemology, philosophy of language and mind, logic as well as ethics and social-
political philosophy; they all are constructive-engagement oriented in view of the 
contribution to the development of contemporary philosophy. Indeed, this 
philosophical-relevance emphasis has rendered them intrinsically relevant to the 
philosophical interest and inquiry of philosophy scholars and students, no matter 
which specific traditions they study and no matter which style of philosophy they 
instantiate, given that they work on issues and topics under examination in the journal 
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articles. In this connection, the constructive-engagement emphasis of this journal 
serves as, or constitutes, one pivot at which the reader can see how these explorations 
on distinct resources from different traditions can be intrinsically and effectively 
unified through comparative philosophy, which otherwise could be easily dismissed 
as irrelevant to each other. 
 It is also worth mentioning that the open-access character of this journal has 
effectively enhanced the availability and impact of the published articles in the 
journal. According to the journal website statistics, although the journal as a new one 
has yet to be widely known, there have been about 25,000 on-line page views of the 
two issues and related contents during the past year at the journal website, and the 
actual page views (including both on-line and off-line views) should substantially 
exceed the above number as the journal sets up both single-article download and 
whole-issue download functions for the reader’s off-line reading convenience. It is 
also noted that, besides those from countries in North America and Europe, the 
readers also include those from many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
where public and university libraries have little resources to subscribe to paid 
academic journals (especially philosophy journals). The open-access strategy of this 
journal has thus contributed to maximizing the impact of those published results in 
comparative philosophy; this is especially relevant and significant in view of the 
nature and mission of comparative philosophy. 
 
                                                                                                                              
Bo Mou 
January 2011 
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ĀTMAN, IDENTITY, AND EMANATION: 
ARGUMENTS FOR A HINDU ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC 
 
CHRISTOPHER FRAMARIN 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Many contemporary authors argue that since certain Hindu texts and 
traditions claim that all living beings are fundamentally the same as Brahman (God), these 
texts and traditions provide the basis for an environmental ethic. I outline three common 
versions of this argument, and argue that each fails to meet at least one criterion for an 
environmental ethic. This doesn’t mean, however, that certain Hindu texts and traditions do 
not provide the basis for an environmental ethic. In the last section of the paper I briefly 
outline and defend an alternative, according to which all plants and animals have intrinsic 
value and direct moral standing in virtue of having a good.  
 
Keywords: Hinduism, environmental ethics, intrinsic value, direct moral standing, Brahman, 
ātman, sentience 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Many contemporary authors argue that since certain Hindu texts and traditions claim 
that all living beings are fundamentally the same as Brahman (God), these texts and 
traditions provide the basis for an environmental ethic.
1
 I outline three common 
versions of this argument, and argue that each fails to meet at least one criterion for 
an environmental ethic.  
  This doesn‟t mean, however, that certain Hindu texts and traditions do not provide 
the basis for an environmental ethic. In the last section of the paper I briefly outline 
and defend an alternative, according to which all plants and animals have intrinsic 
value and direct moral standing in virtue of having a good.  
                                                 
 
FRAMARIN, CHRISTOPHER: Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University 
of Calgary, Canada. Email: chris.framarin@ucalgary.ca 
 
1
 The authors whose views I consider in sections 2 through 5 are often unclear about which Hindu 
texts and traditions they have in mind. Where they are explicit, they refer to Advaita Vedānta, 
Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, and the Upaniṣads. In section 6, I focus primarily on the Manusmṛti, with the 
thought that its authority on matters of dharma is broadly accepted. 
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 2. THREE ARGUMENTS FOR A HINDU ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC 
 
Most authors who write on Hindu environmental ethics offer a version of the 
following argument. Certain Hindu texts and traditions claim that all living beings are 
fundamentally the same as Brahman. Therefore these texts and traditions provide the 
basis for an environmental ethic. The basic argument can be schematized in the 
following way: 
 
(SA – 1) 
Premise: Certain Hindu texts and traditions claim that all living beings are 
fundamentally the same as Brahman. 
Conclusion: Hence these texts and traditions provide the basis for an 
environmental ethic.  
 
 In order for a theory to count as an environmental ethic, it must ascribe both 
intrinsic value and direct moral standing to non-sentient entities in nature (Regan 
1981, 19-20, Thompson 1990, 148). To say that something has intrinsic value is to 
say that it has value independent of further ends towards which it is a means, and 
independent of the evaluations of valuers. To say that an entity has direct moral 
standing is to say that there are possible circumstances in which an agent morally 
ought to consider the entity for its own sake in deciding what to do (Regan 1981, 19-
20, Timmons 2007, 511).
2
 Hence the basic argument can be elaborated to read: 
 
(SA – 2) 
Premise One: Certain Hindu texts and traditions claim that all living beings are 
fundamentally the same as Brahman. 
Conclusion One/Premise Two: Hence these texts and traditions claim that non-
sentient entities have intrinsic value and direct moral standing. 
Conclusion Two: Hence these texts and traditions provide the basis for an 
environmental ethic. 
 
  Implicit in this argument are the claims that (1) Brahman has intrinsic value and 
direct moral standing and (2) if all living beings are fundamentally the same as 
Brahman, then all living beings are intrinsically valuable and have direct moral 
standing. So the full argument reads: 
                                                 
2
 One justification for these criteria is that if non-sentient entities in nature do not have intrinsic value 
and/or direct moral standing, then environmental ethics is not really a distinct subdiscipline. It is 
simply one of many areas within the field of ethics (and/or animal ethics), much like medical ethics or 
business ethics, that deal fundamentally with the ways that human beings should treat one another (and 
perhaps other sentient entities) (Norton 1984, 131-2). This is why many of those who deny the 
plausibility of an environmental ethic still define an environmental ethic in this way (such as 
Thompson [1990]). So „environmenal ethic‟ should not be understood here as a success term, 
equivalent to „plausible ethic of the environment‟ or „adequate ethic of the environment‟, since authors 
disagree widely on what constitutes a plausible ethic of the environment. 
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 (SA – 3) 
Premise One: Certain Hindu texts and traditions claim that all living beings are 
fundamentally the same as Brahman. 
 Premise Two: Brahman is intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing. 
 Premise Three: If all living beings are fundamentally the same as Brahman, and if 
Brahman is intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing, then all living 
beings are intrinsically valuable and have direct moral standing. 
Conclusion One/Premise Four: So certain Hindu texts and traditions claim that 
each living being is intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing. 
Conclusion Two: Hence these texts and traditions provide the basis for an 
environmental ethic.  
 
In what follows, I will refer to this as the „Sameness Argument‟ (SA). It is advanced 
in some form or another by Eliot Deutsch (1970 and 1986), Rajagopal Ryali (1973), 
S. Cromwell Crawford (1982), David Kinsley (1991), Klaus K. Klostermaier (1991), 
Lina Gupta (1993), Harold Coward (1998), O. P. Dwivedi (2000), and others.  
 These authors offer at least three versions of SA, depending in part on which text 
or tradition they emphasize. According to the first version, which I will refer to as the 
„Ātman Argument‟ (AA), certain Hindu texts and traditions claim that each living 
being is an embodied ātman (eternal self). Each ātman is identical with Brahman3 – 
in some sense.
4
 Since each ātman is identical with Brahman, each ātman has intrinsic 
value and direct moral standing. And since each living being is an embodied ātman, 
each living being is intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing. Hence 
certain Hindu texts and traditions provide the basis for an environmental ethic. 
 Crawford advances this version of the argument when he claims that “[t]he 
general idea behind [relevant passages in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad] is that the 
individual ātman is one with the universal Brahman… This Brahman force is 
manifest uniformly in the divinities of heaven, and in human and animal and plant life 
on earth” (Crawford 1982, 150). Hence “Hindu philosophy can provide the basis for 
an environmental ethic” (Ibid., 149). Anantanand Rambachan, arguing that Advaita 
affirms the “[world‟s] value and the value of life in it” (Rambachan 1989, 289), 
advances the Ātman Argument as well. “As the all-pervasive reality, and as the axis 
of the universe which intersects all things, God, in Advaita, exists at the deepest 
levels… as the Self (ātman)” (Rambachan 1989, 294).5  
The Ātman Argument can be schematized in the following way: 
                                                 
3
 Bhagavadgītā 10.20, for example, reads, “I am the ātman, O Arjuna, that resides in the heart of all 
beings (aham ātmā guḍākeśa sarvabhūtāśayasthitaḥ/)” (Sadhale 2000b, 234). 
4
 I say “in some sense” in order to make the argument consistent with a variety of metaphysical 
pictures, including Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita. See below.  
5
 Ryali also mentions the correlation between ātman and Brahman in his analysis of Hinduism‟s 
conception of “man‟s relationship with nature” (Ryali 1973: 48). He says, “Brahman resides in atman 
and indeed Brahman is atman” (Ryali 1973, 49). His view, like Rambachan‟s, is ambiguous – it is not 
clear if he takes the ātman to be identical with Brahman, or simply part of Brahman. 
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(AA) 
Premise One: Certain Hindu texts and traditions claim that the ātman is identical 
with Brahman in some sense. 
Premise Two: Brahman is intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing. 
Premise Three: If each ātman is identical with Brahman, and if Brahman is 
intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing, then each ātman is 
intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing. 
Premise Four: If each ātman is intrinsically valuable and has direct moral 
standing, and if each living being is an embodied ātman, then each living being is 
intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing. 
Conclusion One/Premise Five: So according to certain Hindu texts and traditions, 
each living being is intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing. 
Conclusion Two: Hence these texts and traditions provide the basis for an 
environmental ethic.  
 
According to the second version of SA, certain Hindu texts and traditions claim 
that the distinctions between people, animals, plants, and Brahman are finally unreal. 
Hence everything is ultimately numerically and qualitatively identical with 
Brahman.
6
 Since everything is identical with Brahman in this sense, and since 
Brahman has intrinsic value and direct moral standing, everything has intrinsic value 
and direct moral standing. Hence these Hindu texts and traditions provide the basis 
for an environmental ethic.  
This seems to be the sense of at least one of Deutsch‟s arguments for a Hindu 
environmental ethic. He says, “Vedānta would maintain that… fundamentally all life 
is one… and that this oneness finds its natural expression in a reverence for all living 
things” (Deutsch 1970, 82).7 In defense of the claim that Hinduism endorses “treating 
the creation with respect without harming and exploiting others,” Dwivedi claims that 
“for the Hindus of the ancient period, God and nature were one and the same” 
(Dwivedi 2000, 5-6).
8
  
This second version of the argument can be schematized as follows: 
 
(IA) 
Premise One: Certain Hindu texts and traditions claim that the distinction between 
living beings and Brahman is unreal.  
                                                 
6
 Gītā 11.20, for example, reads, “All space between heaven and earth is occupied by you [Kṛṣṇa] 
alone (dyāvāpṛthivyor idam antạraṃ hi vyāptaṃ tvayaikena diśaś ca sarvāḥ˙)” (Sadhale 2000, 293). 
18.20 states, “Know that knowledge to be sattvic by which [a person] sees the one eternal being in all 
beings, the undivided in the divided (sarvabhūteṣu yenaikaṃ bhāvam avyayam īkṣate / avibhaktaṃ 
vibhakteṣu taj jñānaṃ viddhi sāttvikam //)” (Sadhale 2000c, 330). 
7
 Vasudha Narayanan ascribes this view to Deutsch (Narayanan 1997, 298). 
8
 A number of authors outline the implications of Vedāntin “monism,” such as Ryali (1973, 49), 
Kinsley (1991, 239), and Christopher Key Chapple (1993, 75). Presumably they have some version of 
IA in mind as well.  
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Premise Two: Brahman is intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing. 
Premise Three: If the distinction between living beings and Brahman is unreal, 
and if Brahman is intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing, then all 
living beings are intrinsically valuable and have direct moral standing. 
Conclusion One/Premise Four: So according to certain Hindu texts and traditions, 
each living being is intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing. 
Conclusion Two: Hence these texts and traditions provide the basis for an 
environmental ethic.  
 
In what follows, I will refer to this argument as the „Identity Argument‟ (IA).  
According to the third version of SA, certain Hindu texts claim that all of nature is 
a manifestation of Brahman.
9
 „Manifestation of Brahman’ in this context means that 
Brahman produces or creates nature from its own form, so that the substance of 
nature is the same as that of Brahman.
10
 Hence nature is identical with Brahman in 
this sense.
11
 Since all of nature is a manifestation of Brahman, all of nature is 
intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing. Hence these texts and traditions 
provide the basis for an environmental ethic. 
This version of SA is the most popular. Coward, for example, claims that  
 
Hindus speak of the cosmos (including the stars, the atmosphere, the earth, plants, 
animals, and humans) as God‟s body. Since everything is divine, an ethic of reverence 
and respect is demanded from humans toward all other manifestations of God‟s body 
(Coward 1998, 40). 
 
Gupta argues that since “Hinduism speaks of… the essence called „Brahman‟ that 
manifests itself in manifolds of this universe… all parts of this Nature have an 
intrinsic value” (Gupta 1993, 113). Dwivedi argues for an Indian environmental ethic 
by citing the claim from Bhāgavata Purāṇa (2.2.41) that “ether, air, fire, water, earth, 
planets, all creatures, directions, trees and plants, rivers, and seas, they are all organs 
of God‟s body” (Dwivedi 2000, 5). Klostermaier and Patricia Y. Mumme defend this 
kind of view as well. They explicitly associate it with Rāmānuja and Viśiṣṭādvaita 
(qualified non-dualism), but point out that it has its origins in earlier texts, such as the 
Puruṣa Sukta, Śatapaṭha Brāhmaṇa, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, 
Bhagavadgītā, and Bhāgavata Purāṇa (Klostermaier 1991, 250-1 and Mumme 1998, 
139).
12
  
                                                 
9
 Gītā 10.8, for example, reads: “I am the source of all. From me all arises (ahaṃ sarvasya prabhavo 
mattaḥ sarvaṃ pravartate /)” (Sadhale 2000b, 218).  
10
 Brahman, on this view, is the material, or what Julius Lipner calls the “substantial cause” 
(upādānakāraṇa) of the world (Lipner 1986, 82). 
11
 Note that this sense of identity is different from the sense of identity in IA. One might say that a 
certain person, plant, or animal is God in the sense that they in part constitute God, without claiming 
that a certain person, plant, or animal is qualitatively and numerically identical with God. 
12
 David Kinsley also claims that everything is a manifestation of Brahman as part of an argument for a 
Hindu environmental ethic (Kinsley 1991, 239). Also see Deutsch (Deutsch 1970, 83). 
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This third version of the argument, which I will call the „Emanation Argument‟ 
(EA), reads: 
 
(EA) 
Premise One: Certain Hindu texts and traditions claim that all living beings are a 
manifestation of Brahman. 
Premise Two: Brahman is intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing. 
Premise Three: If each living being is a manifestation of Brahman, and if 
Brahman is intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing, then all living 
beings are intrinsically valuable and have direct moral standing. 
Conclusion One/Premise Four: So according to certain Hindu texts and traditions, 
each living being is intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing. 
Conclusion Two: Hence these texts and traditions provide the basis for an 
environmental ethic.  
 
As Klostermaier and Mumme point out, the Emanation Argument is most 
naturally associated with Viśiṣṭādvaita. The Identity Argument, in contrast, is most 
naturally associated with Advaita. These associations are helpful as a rule of thumb, 
but I want to avoid identifying these arguments with these traditions too strongly. 
Again, as is clear in Klostermaier and Mumme‟s accounts, these philosophical themes 
have their origin in texts that precede the distinction between Advaita and 
Viśiṣṭādvaita. Both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja defend these systems with extensive 
references to texts that precede them.
13
 
 
3. OBJECTIONS TO THE ĀTMAN ARGUMENT 
 
The third premise of the Ātman Argument states that if each ātman is intrinsically 
valuable and has direct moral standing, then each living being is intrinsically valuable 
and has direct moral standing. At first this inference might seem puzzling. It‟s not 
clear how the intrinsic value of one item – in this case, the ātman – can transfer to 
another item – in this case, the living body. Indeed, many contemporary philosophers 
define intrinsic value in terms of the value an item or state of affairs has independent 
of its relations with other objects or states of affairs.  
G. E. Moore‟s influential position is that a state of affairs has intrinsic value just 
in case it has value in complete isolation. Its value must persist even in the absence of 
everything else (Moore 1903, 187).
14
 The body component in the ātman/body 
                                                 
13
 It should be no surprise that many of these authors advance more than one version of SA. The Ātman 
Argument, after all, is entailed by IA and EA (so long as the identity cited in AA is qualified 
appropriately), but does not entail either.  
14
 I take Moore‟s formulation to be equivalent to the formulation of intrinsic value that I offer above, 
according to which intrinsic value is value independent of both means-end relations and what might be 
called „valued-valuer relations‟. John O‟Neill offers what he takes to be examples of other types of 
relations that are excluded by Moore‟s formulation, but which do not reduce to either the means-end or 
valuer-valued relation. He offers the example of wilderness, and argues that it has value “because it is 
9 
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composite does not have value in the absence of everything else, however, because it 
is valuable only in virtue of being inhabited by, or in some way connected with, an 
ātman. The claim that the living body is entirely without value, even though the 
ātman with which it is connected has great intrinsic value, seems consistent.  
Indeed, the primary objection to a Hindu environmental ethic advanced by 
contemporary authors has been just this. Lance E. Nelson, for example, claims that 
according to the Bhagavadgītā, “ātman is what is important. The physical, on the 
other hand, is expendable, and certainly not worth any emotional distress” (Nelson 
2000, 141). J. Baird Callicott (Callicott 1987, 124) and Arvind Sharma (1998, 57-8), 
among others,
15
 make the same claim.  
Consider the following analogy. Assume that human beings are intrinsically 
valuable. A certain human being must spend the rest of her life in an Iron Lung. 
(Suppose it‟s 1930.) In this situation, it‟s clear that the Iron Lung has instrumental 
value, as a means of keeping the person alive. It does not come to have intrinsic 
value, however, merely because an intrinsically valuable person inhabits it for her 
entire life. Likewise, it seems, the material body does not come to have intrinsic value 
merely because an intrinsically valuable ātman inhabits it for a lifetime.  
One might reply that the intrinsic value of the ātman need not establish the 
intrinsic value of the isolated body. All it must do is establish the intrinsic value of 
the ātman/body composite, and this it does. In the Iron Lung case, when an 
intrinsically valuable person occupies the Iron Lung, the person/Iron Lung composite 
is intrinsically valuable, even if the Iron Lung by itself is not, simply because the 
person is. This is all that is required for AA to succeed. The ātman/body composite is 
intrinsically valuable, even if the body is not, simply because the ātman is.  
This kind of view, even if it technically succeeds at establishing the intrinsic value 
of the living being, seems at least to miss some of the spirit of the demands of an 
environmental ethic. Holmes Rolston III objects to a related argument by saying, 
“animals need to be valued… as biological agents…” (Rolston III 1987, 175). The 
word „agents‟ here is somewhat misleading in the present context, since an 
environmental ethic must attribute intrinsic value and direct moral standing to non-
sentient entities in nature whether they are agents – that is, whether they are capable 
of intentional action – or not. So the objection can be revised to read: animals and 
plants need to be valued as biological entities – and not simply as biological 
containers for something else that has intrinsic value and direct moral standing. The 
most plausible version of AA, however, does not value animals or plants as biological 
entities, but as embodied ātmans.  
The problem becomes more apparent if we consider the issue of moral standing. 
Even if living beings are intrinsically valuable, as a consequence of being constituted 
                                                                                                                                           
untouched by humans” (O‟Neill: 1992, 125). Yet the relation of being untouched by humans does not 
reduce to the means-end or valuer-valued relation. The problem with the example is that it is not 
obvious that the value that wilderness has in virtue of being wilderness is intrinsic. If it is not, then the 
example does not demonstrate that intrinsic value excludes relations other than the means-end and 
valuer-valued relations. The same is true of O‟Neil‟s example of rarity (O‟Neill 1992, 124). 
15
 See also Basant K. Lal (1986, 200-1) and Rita DasGupta Sherma (1998, 95). 
10 
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in part by the ātman, it is not clear that the direct moral standing of the ātman 
transfers to the living being that it inhabits.  
In the most famous discussion of the topic within the Indian philosophical 
tradition, the Bhagavadgītā states that the ātman is not harmed by the destruction of 
the body. “Weapons do not cut [the ātman], fire does not burn it, waters do not wet it, 
the wind does not dessicate it… The body being killed, [The ātman] is not killed” 
(2.23, 2.20).
16
 That we must, in deliberating over whether to perform a certain action, 
consider how the ātman will be affected does not entail that we must, in deliberating 
over whether to perform a certain action, consider how the body that is inhabited by 
the ātman will be affected, because the ātman is not affected by what happens to the 
body. As Nelson says with regard to the Bhagavadgītā, “physical harm – whether the 
destruction of war or, presumably, ecological devastation – however regrettable on 
the empirical level, does not affect what ultimately matters, namely spirit” (Nelson 
2000, 142).
17
  
So the first two objections to AA might be understood as two different versions of 
a similar transfer problem. The first objection is that the intrinsic value of the ātman 
does not transfer to the biological being. The second objection is that the direct moral 
standing of the ātman cannot transfer to the biological being.18  
This second objection can be strengthened. It is not clear that ātman or Brahman 
has direct moral standing in the first place. In many classical texts, such as the 
Yogasūtra, the Sāṃkhyakārika, the Gītā, and various Upaniṣads, the ātman (or 
puruṣa) is typically characterized as an uninvolved and unaffected witness to the 
events of the world. In other texts, including some Upaniṣads, the ātman is described 
as the agent within the living being.
19
 Nonetheless, the ātman is unchanging, and 
untouched by pain and pleasure. The same is true of Brahman.
20
 In other words, 
neither Brahman nor ātman could be affected by any event whatsoever.21 
                                                 
16
 nainaṃ chindanti śastrāṇi nainaṃ dahati pāvakaḥ / na cainaṃ kledayanty āpo na śoṣayati mārutaḥ 
/… na hanyate hanyamāne śarīre // (Sadhale 2000a, 136 and 119). Both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja 
interpret the verses straightforwardly. 
17
 See footnote 21 below for an objection and reply. 
18
 Each version of the transfer problem is unique to the present context. Intrinsic value cannot be 
transferred in the above way because intrinsic value is the value that an entity has independent of its 
relations to other things, and direct moral standing cannot be transferred in the above way because the 
initial entity from which direct moral standing is supposed to transfer (the ātman) does not have direct 
moral standing in the first place. I don‟t mean to say that there is a problem in transferring qualities 
from one entity to another more generally.  
19
 Neither Hindu traditions in general nor Vedāntin traditions are uniform in their characterization of 
the relations between Brahman, ātman, and the body, but these are the most dominant conceptions.  
20
 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad identifies both Brahman and ātman as the inner controller (antaryāmiṇa) 
of the body (BU 3.7.1), but also describes the ātman as free of hunger, thirst, pain, and delusion (BU 
3.5.1). 
21
 This is surely the Sāṃkhyan and Yogic view, which the Gītā, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and others 
generally adopt. There are some passages, however, such as Gītā 17.6, that suggest that both ātman 
and Brahman are indeed affected by the events of the body. The verse reads: “the mindless, causing 
harm to the body, [which is] the aggregate of physical elements, also [cause harm to] me within the 
body. Know them as demonic [in their] intentions (karśayantaḥ śarīrasthaṃ bhūtagrāmam acetasaḥ / 
11 
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If neither Brahman nor ātman could be affected by any event, then there is no 
possible set of circumstances in which a being must consider how Brahman or ātman 
will be affected by an action. If there is no possible set of circumstances in which a 
being must consider how Brahman or ātman will be affected by an action, then 
neither Brahman nor ātman has direct moral standing, since to say that a being has 
direct moral standing is to say that there are possible circumstances in which an agent 
morally ought to consider the entity for its own sake in deciding what to do. And if 
neither Brahman nor ātman has direct moral standing, the direct moral standing of the 
ātman cannot transfer to the body or the ātman/body composite. 
The cogency of AA, however, depends on the truth of the claim that the ātman 
has direct moral standing. Since the ātman does not have direct moral standing, the 
argument is unconvincing. If the argument fails, then AA does not prove that certain 
Indian texts and traditions provide the basis for an environmental ethic. 
 
4. OBJECTIONS TO THE IDENTITY ARGUMENT 
 
Both the Identity Argument and the Emanation Argument might be thought of as 
more robust versions of the Ātman Argument. AA states that every ātman is in some 
sense identical with Brahman. IA and EA state that everything – including every 
ātman – is in some sense identical with Brahman. Hence the failure of AA to 
establish a Hindu environmental ethic need not mean that IA and/or EA fail as well.  
The Identity Argument certainly avoids the first objection to AA – the objection 
that the intrinsic value of the ātman does not transfer to the biological organism per se 
– because according to IA, the biological organism is identical with both ātman and 
Brahman. Hence the intrinsic value of the biological organism is not a result of the 
problematic transfer of intrinsic value from the ātman or Brahman. The biological 
organism‟s value just is the value of Brahman. 
IA is equally vulnerable, however, to the second objection to AA. The cogency of 
IA depends essentially on the plausibility of the claim that Brahman has direct moral 
standing (Premise Two). If Brahman does not have direct moral standing – as I argue 
above – then the direct moral standing of Brahman cannot establish the direct moral 
standing of living beings, sentient or non-sentient. Hence IA fails to show that certain 
Indian texts and traditions (namely those that claim that all distinctions are illusory) 
provide the basis for an environmental ethic, because IA fails to show that living 
beings have direct moral standing.  
My point here is not that since, according to IA, the living being is identical with 
Brahman, and since Brahman lacks direct moral standing, so does the living being. If 
this were the point, long digressions about the distinction between conventional and 
ultimate reality would be unavoidable. (See below.) My point is more modest. Since 
                                                                                                                                           
māṃ caivāntaś śarīrasthaṃ tān viddhy āsuraniścayān //)” (Sadhale 2000c, 248). These kinds of 
passages are overshadowed by the more common and extensive claims to the contrary, which 
emphasize a radical dualism between ātman/Brahman and the body. The former are, however, quite 
promising as bases for the development of a Hindu environmental ethic. (My thanks to an anonymous 
referee at Comparative Philosophy for this point.) 
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Brahman does not have direct moral standing to begin with, IA is unconvincing, 
because IA claims that the direct moral standing of Brahman is the basis for the direct 
moral standing of the living being. This is consistent, however, with the establishment 
of the direct moral standing of living beings by some other means. (See below.) 
IA also faces an objection that AA avoids. Thus far, I have focused on two criteria 
for an environmental ethic. An environmental ethic must (1) attribute intrinsic value 
to non-sentient entities in nature, and (2) attribute direct moral standing to non-
sentient entities in nature. These criteria are not exhaustive, however. Additionally, an 
environmental ethic must satisfy what Janna Thompson calls the “non-vacuity 
requirement” (Thompson 1990, 149). Thompson argues that  
 
[t]he criteria for determining what things or states of affairs are intrinsically valuable 
must not be such so that it turns out that every thing and every state of affairs counts as 
equally valuable. The reason why this requirement must be satisfied should be clear. An 
ethic is supposed to tell us what we ought or ought not to do; however, it cannot do so if 
it turns out that all things and states of affairs are equally valuable, for if they are, then 
there is no reason to do one thing rather than another, to bring about one state of affairs 
rather than another (Ibid.). 
 
An ethic of any sort is supposed to be action-guiding. It is supposed to tell us what to 
do under certain circumstances. In order for an ethic to tell us what to do, it must be 
able to discriminate between what is good and bad. If a theory attributes equal value 
to everything,
22
 however, then it cannot discriminate between good and bad, because 
everything is equally good or bad. Nothing is any better than anything else.
23
  
Consider the example of murder. It might be thought that since a living person is 
intrinsically valuable, the person should not be harmed (all other things being equal). 
Hence killing is worse than avoiding killing. If, however, the value of the dead body 
is equal to the value of the living body, it is not clear why refraining from murder is 
preferable to murder. In both cases the outcome is equally valuable – a dead body is 
no less valuable than a living body. Even the sorrow of the friends and family of the 
murdered is equally valuable to the joy they might have felt if the murder had not 
occurred. Hence on this view, the distinctions between right and wrong, and good and 
bad, disappear.  
IA, however, entails that everything has equal value. Notice first that Premise One 
of IA is unnecessarily narrow. If all distinctions are illusory, then the distinctions 
between Brahman and inanimate objects are illusory along with the distinctions 
between living beings and Brahman. Instead, Premise One should read: “Certain 
Indian texts and traditions claim that the distinctions between all things and Brahman 
                                                 
22
 By „equal value‟ I mean value that is both of the same kind and of the same quantity.  
23
 An objection might go as follows. An ethic is action guiding if it draws the distinction between right 
and wrong. The distinction between right and wrong, however, might not depend on the distinction 
between good and bad. This is what Kant, among others, asserts. Yet Kant‟s view also depends on 
ascribing intrinsic value to human beings (and denying it to other entities and things).  
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are unreal.” Premise Two states that Brahman has intrinsic value. When these 
premises are combined with Premise Three, which says that if the distinction between 
Brahman and X is illusory and Brahman has intrinsic value, then X has intrinsic 
value, they entail the conclusion “all things are intrinsically valuable.”  If their value 
derives exclusively from their identity with Brahman – and IA says nothing to 
suggest that this is not the case – then all things are equally intrinsically valuable. If 
all things are equally intrinsically valuable, then the distinctions between good and 
bad and/or right and wrong are lost. Hence IA cannot establish an environmental 
ethic. 
Again, some distinction might be drawn here between ultimate and conventional 
reality. One might admit that Advaita (as an example) attributes equal value to all 
things at the ultimate level, but insist that at the conventional level Advaita accepts 
evaluative distinctions. At the conventional level, a living person, animal, or plant is 
more valuable than a dead one, and the act of protecting life is better (more right) 
than the act of killing. Since most human beings live life at the conventional level, it 
is this level that is relevant to environmental ethics. 
The problem with this response is that the proponent of IA argues that the 
conventional conception of the value of things – according to which there are 
differences in the value of things, and so on – should be replaced by the ultimate 
conception of the value of things – according to which all things are identical, and 
therefore have equal value. The proponent cannot, then, cite aspects of the 
conventional conception as a means of avoiding the further implications of attributing 
equal value to all things. The proponent of IA says that we should see all things as 
identical with Brahman. The proponent cannot then reply to the vacuity objection by 
pointing out that ordinarily we do not see all things as Brahman.
24
 
 
5. OBJECTIONS TO THE EMANATION ARGUMENT 
 
Like the Identity Argument, the Emanation Argument entails that the biological entity 
has intrinsic value, since the biological entity, like the ātman, emanates from, and is 
constituted by Brahman. So EA avoids the first objection to the Ātman Argument. 
 EA is just as vulnerable, however, to the second objection to AA. Like IA, EA 
states that Brahman has direct moral standing (Premise Two of both arguments), and 
this premise is crucial to deriving the conclusion that each living being has direct 
moral standing. If Brahman does not have direct moral standing – as I argue above – 
then even if Premise Three is true – “If each living being is a manifestation of 
Brahman, and if Brahman is intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing, then 
all living beings are intrinsically valuable and have direct moral standing” – it does 
not follow that all living beings have direct moral standing. Hence EA does not 
provide the basis for an environmental ethic. 
                                                 
24
 Nelson argues that Advaita and the Bhagavadgītā deny that the material world has intrinsic value 
(Nelson 1998, 2000). I don‟t think his argument succeeds, but the distinction between conventional 
and ultimate reality cannot refute it, for the same reasons I outline here.  
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 Additionally, EA seems to face the vacuity objection. Again, Premise One is too 
narrow. Not only living beings, but non-living things are a manifestation of Brahman. 
Rāmānuja, for example, elaborates Gītā 10.8, which reads: “I am the creator of all”25 
as “I am the creator, the cause and origin, of the manifestation of all manifold 
[things], sentient and non-sentient.”26 Throughout his commentaries on the Gītā and 
the Brahmasūtra, Rāmānuja simply says that Brahman is the creator of all things, and 
that both eternal selves and matter constitute God‟s body (Carman 1974, 115). 
Likewise, none of the creation stories that Mumme or Klostermaier cite specify that 
Brahman only creates living beings. Mumme says, citing the best-known analogies 
for the emanationist perspective,  
 
[a]s a spider emits a thread (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. 2.1.20 and Muṇḍaka Up. 1.1.7) or as 
grass arises from the earth, or as hairs arise from the body, so too, from the Imperishable 
Lord, arises all of creation (Muṇḍaka Up. 1.1.7) (Mumme 1998, 139, emphasis added). 
 
Hence Premise One of EA should instead read: “Certain Hindu texts and traditions 
claim that all things are a manifestation of Brahman.” 
 Premise Two states that Brahman has intrinsic value. When these premises are 
combined with Premise Three – which says that if X is a manifestation of Brahman, 
and if Brahman is intrinsically valuable, then X is intrinsically valuable – they entail 
that all things are intrinsically valuable. If their value derives exclusively from being 
a manifestation of Brahman – and the argument says nothing to suggest otherwise – 
then EA entails that all things have equal intrinsic value. If a theory attributes equal 
intrinsic value to all things, however, it cannot discriminate between good and bad 
and/or right and wrong. It cannot be action-guiding, and therefore cannot be an 
ethic.
27
  
                                                 
25
 ahaṃ sarvasya prabhavaḥ… (Sadhale 2000b, 218). 
26
 ahaṃ sarvasya vicitracidacitprapañcasya prabhava utpattikāraṇam… (Sadhale 2000b, 219, lines 
27-28). 
27
 It might be objected that according to some of the texts and systems that imply the Emanation 
Argument, different things instantiate Brahman to different degrees, and hence that different things 
have varying levels of intrinsic value and/or direct moral standing. Rāmānuja, for example, explains 
Gītā 2.16, which states, “Existence is not found among the unreal. Non-existence is not found among 
the real (nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ /)” (Sadhale 2000a, 102), by quoting Viṣṇu 
Purāṇa: “Consciousness (jñāna) is real, whereas all else is unreal (jñānaṃ yathā satyam asatyam 
anyat)” (Sadhale 2000a, 104, line 35). If consciousness is more real than non-consciousness, then 
perhaps conscious entities are more valuable, or have greater direct moral standing, than non-conscious 
entities. If this is right, then the vacuity objection might be avoided – a living body is more valuable 
than a dead body because the living body is conscious.  
 If this is the argument, however, then proponents of the Emanation Argument must make this case 
explicitly, and presumably concede that it is not simply the fact that an entity emanates from Brahman 
that makes it valuable/worthy of consideration, but something more. Additionally, even if this case is 
made, the account faces some of the other problems I have raised above. In the same passage in which 
Rāmānuja states that consciousness is more real than non-consciousness, he says that “the real has the 
nature of indestructibility (vināśasvabhāvo hy asattvam avināśasvabhāvaś ca sattvam)” (Sadhale 
2000a, 104, line 33). If consciousness is indestructible, then it is not clear that it can be harmed, and 
hence unclear how it can have direct moral standing. (This is not to say that it cannot be. But some 
15 
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 Finally, EA faces an objection that IA does not. Premise Three of IA states, “If 
the distinction between living beings and Brahman is unreal, and if Brahman is 
intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing, then all living beings are 
intrinsically valuable and have direct moral standing.” The premise seems plausible in 
part because if two items are identical, it is hard to see how one could have qualities 
that the other lacks. If the capital of Canada is Ottawa, then if Ottawa has over one 
million people, so does the capital of Canada. Likewise, if a living being is identical 
with Brahman, then if Brahman has intrinsic value and direct moral standing, then so 
does the living being. 
 Premise Three of EA, in contrast, states, “If each living being is a manifestation 
of Brahman, and if Brahman is intrinsically valuable and has direct moral standing, 
then all living beings are intrinsically valuable and have direct moral standing.” There 
is no corresponding platitude, however, to the effect that if one item is a manifestation 
of another, the former has all of the qualities that the latter possesses. Consider one of 
the analogies just mentioned. Assume that a human being is intrinsically valuable. 
The hair of a human being emanates from the human being. It might even be said to 
be of the same substance as a human being. From this it does not follow that the hair 
is also intrinsically valuable. Similarly, the fact that living beings emanate from 
Brahman does not obviously entail that they share in Brahman’s intrinsic value.  
 Indeed, there is a precedent in Rāmānuja‟s work for denying that living beings 
possess the qualities of Brahman. Brahman is, among other things, infinite and 
eternal, unlike any of the entities he creates.
28
 Brahman is often described as 
omniscient and perfectly blissful. Rocks, however, are incapable of knowledge or 
bliss, and even human beings are rarely perfectly knowledgeable or blissful. If a 
number of Brahman’s qualities do not inhere in elements of his creation, despite these 
elements emanating from Brahman, then at the very least the proponent of EA must 
offer an argument for why the intrinsic value of Brahman does inhere in the elements 
of his creation, even though other qualities of Brahman do not. Yet proponents of EA 
do not make this case. And even if there are arguments for the claim that certain 
qualities inhere in the elements of creation, there must be additional arguments for the 
claim that the qualities inhere only in certain entities. Again, proponents of EA do not 
make this case. 
 
6. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ĀTMAN, IDENTITY, AND  
EMANATION ARGUMENTS 
 
Arguments for an Indian environmental ethic that rely on some kind of identity 
between nature and God are unconvincing. It isn‟t clear, however, that this kind of 
argument is needed. R. W. Perrett argues that certain Indian texts and traditions 
                                                                                                                                           
case must be made that this is so.) Additionally, it seems to be the conscious entity that resides in the 
material body – and not the biological entity per se – that is truly real, and hence not the material body 
that has greater value or moral standing. 
28
 So long as „eternal‟ is taken to mean always existent in both the past and present.  
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ascribe direct moral standing to all sentient beings in virtue of their sentience. He 
offers the following argument: 
 
It is possible to construct arguments for our direct duty to animals… Thus, consider first 
the assumption that was erroneously supposed to support the indirect duty view: that we 
each ought to self-interestedly pursue our own liberation as our primary goal. But why 
should we pursue mokṣa [liberation] at all? Because, says the Indian tradition, life is 
essentially characterized by suffering and unsatisfactoriness (duḥkha). It is the 
elimination of this suffering that is intrinsically valuable, indeed the ultimate value… But 
if we admit these claims then we must also come to ask ourselves what is so special about 
our own suffering. What properties do I possess that make my suffering morally 
significant without it also being the case that others‟ suffering is equally morally 
significant? Rationally we are drawn towards a universal perspective on our own 
suffering (Perrett 1993, 94). 
 
My attainment of mokṣa is intrinsically valuable (at least in part) because my 
avoidance of suffering is intrinsically valuable. There is nothing about me that 
distinguishes me in a relevant way from other sentient beings. Therefore the 
avoidance of suffering is intrinsically valuable regardless of whose suffering it is.  
 A parallel argument concludes that pleasure or happiness is intrinsically valuable 
regardless of whose it is: My attainment of mokṣa is intrinsically valuable (at least in 
part) because my happiness is intrinsically valuable. There is nothing about me that 
distinguishes me in a relevant way from other sentient beings. Therefore happiness is 
intrinsically valuable regardless of whose it is. Hence we have direct duties to sentient 
beings. If we have direct duties to sentient beings, then sentient beings have direct 
moral standing, and presumably intrinsic value.
29
  
There is still some space between the conclusion of Perrett‟s argument and the 
criteria for an environmental ethic. If Perrett is right, then we might conclude that all 
sentient beings have direct moral standing and intrinsic value. In order for a theory to 
count as an environmental ethic, however, it must ascribe intrinsic value and direct 
moral standing to non-sentient beings, like so-called lower animals, plants and so on. 
In a number of Hindu texts, however, lower animals and plants are described as 
sentient as well.
30
 Manusmṛti 1.49, for example, reads:  
 
Those [beings], enveloped by the tamas [one of three basic elements (guṇas) that 
constitute the material universe, characterized by darkness and ignorance] with many 
                                                 
29
 If this argument succeeds, then it might be inferred from each of the classical Indian darśanas – 
including, with some modifications, Nyāya, which denies that liberation is pleasurable.  
30
 In what follows, I focus on the Manusmṛti in particular, although the views of the Manusmṛti – along 
with its authority – are accepted quite broadly. Perrett‟s argument above, for example, seems to come 
from Śaṇkara‟s Gītābhāṣya 6.32, which explains that the yogin knows, by analogy with himself, that 
pleasure is desirable and pain undesirable, no matter whose it is.  
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forms caused by [past] actions, are internally conscious, and fully endowed with [the 
capacity for] pleasure and pain.
31
  
 
If Perrett‟s argument is convincing, and if all living beings are sentient, then all living 
beings have direct moral standing and intrinsic value. If all living beings have direct 
moral standing and intrinsic value, then at least the first two criteria for an 
environmental ethic are satisfied.
32
 The non-vacuity requirement is also satisfied, 
since some things are non-sentient, and hence devoid of direct moral standing and 
intrinsic value. Hence, one might conclude, certain Indian texts and traditions provide 
the basis for an environmental ethic.   
There is little doubt that the Indian Law Books are concerned with the matter of 
causing pain to plants and animals. One passage from the Manusmṛti (8.286) advises 
rulers to punish in proportion to the pain caused: “If a person strikes people or 
animals to pain [them], just as great as the pain [caused], just that great should the 
punishment be.”33 This suggests that the quantity of pain is the measure of the 
wrongness of an action, and that the capacity for pleasure and pain makes the well-
being of sentient beings relevant. 
In another important passage (5.49), Manu says, “having seen the origin of meat 
and the binding and slaughter of embodied beings (dehinām), [a person] turns away 
from eating all meat.”34 This might be taken to imply that to the careful observer, the 
value of animals is self-evident. One thing that is evident to anyone is that animals 
experience pain and pleasure. All of this implies that sentient beings have direct 
moral standing and intrinsic value because they are capable of experiencing pleasure 
and pain. 
 One obvious objection to this kind of view is that many animals, and all plants, 
are not in fact sentient. One way to avoid this problem is to argue that certain Indian 
texts and traditions attribute intrinsic value and direct moral standing to animals and 
plants because they are alive. Each of the passages cited above might be interpreted in 
accord with this claim, simply because pain is typically a consequence of harm, and 
harm often has the consequence of shortening life. The more severe the pain is, the 
more likely it is that the pain will have a negative consequence on the being‟s 
                                                 
31
 tamasā bahurūpeṇa veṣṭitāḥ karmahetunā / antaḥsaṃjñā bhavanty ete sukhaduḥkhasamanvitāḥ // 
(Jhā 1999a, 29). 
32
 One small oddity arises here. In order for a theory to count as an environmental ethic, it must ascribe 
intrinsic value and direct moral standing to non-sentient entities. If the Manusmṛti ascribes intrinsic 
value and direct moral standing to entities in virtue of their sentience, however, then it technically fails 
to ascribe intrinsic value and direct moral standing to non-sentient entities, even though it attributes 
sentience to plants and so-called lower animals. In order to avoid this counter-intuitive consequence, 
the criteria for an environmental ethic ought to be interpreted to read: in order for a theory to count as 
an environmental ethic, it must ascribe intrinsic value and direct moral standing to entities normally 
considered non-sentient, such as plants and lower animals. 
33
 manuṣyāṇāṃ paśūnāṃ ca duḥkhāya prahṛte sati / yathā yathā mahadduḥkhaṃ daṇḍaṃ kuryāt tathā 
tathā // (Jha 1999b, 196). 
34
 samutpattiṃ ca māṃsasya vādhabandhau ca dehinām / prasamīkṣya nivarteta sarvamāṃsasya 
bhakṣaṇāt // (Jhā 1999a, 441). 
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longevity. This is why, one might argue, the severity of the punishment tends to 
correspond with the severity of the pain. 
 The passage that states “having carefully considered the origin of meat and the 
tying up and slaughter of living beings [that is the source of meat], a person turns 
away from the eating of all meat,” implies that the reason meat-eating is wrong is 
self-evident. Even more self-evident than the animal‟s pain as a result of slaughter, 
however, is the animal‟s death.  
Elsewhere, Manu warns against hindering a calf from suckling (4.59). To merely 
hinder a calf‟s suckling might be painful to the calf and the mother, by producing 
hunger pangs and anxiety, but to preclude it altogether is deadly. Hence these 
passages support the view that the criterion of being alive is the basis of the intrinsic 
value and direct moral standing of plants and animals as well.  
The criterion of being alive makes better sense, however, of those passages that 
describe punishments for killing. If all that is wrong with killing is that it tends to 
produce pain, killing an animal should be no worse than actions that cause equivalent 
pain. Yet the Law Books typically single out killing as a special kind of trespass.  
 The criterion of being alive also has the advantage of explaining why the painless 
killing of animals and plants is wrong – even if their lives, if spared, will not be more 
pleasurable than painful. Medhātithi, the most important commentator on the 
Manusmṛti, says clearly that plant life, in particular, is almost exclusively painful. 
 
Due to an abundance of tamas, tied to infidelity to the Vedas, pain, and so on, [plants] are 
experiencing the fruits of their adharmic [acts] for a very long time – [as if] eternally. 
And from the presence of sattva [another of the three guṇas, typically characterized in 
terms of lightness and knowledge] in them, under certain conditions, [plants] also enjoy a 
little pleasure as well (1.49).
35
  
 
An animal birth, like a plant birth, is also on balance more painful than pleasurable. 
What could be the fault, then, in killing a sleeping animal, if only pain has disvalue?
36
 
If being alive is intrinsically valuable, however, then killing an animal is wrong 
whether it is asleep or awake.  
 So while the Manusmṛti is concerned with pleasure and pain, it is also concerned 
with killing. The concern with pleasure and pain is better explained by the concern 
with killing than the concern with killing is explained by the concern with pleasure 
and pain. Additionally, the criterion of being alive avoids two objections to the 
criterion of sentience. First, it is simply false that all plants and animals are sentient. It 
is true, however, that all plants and animals are alive (at least for as long as we want 
to attribute intrinsic value and direct moral standing to them). Second, the criterion of 
                                                 
35
 atas tamobahulyān nityaṃ nirvedaduḥkhādiyuktā adharmaphalam anubhavantaḥ suciram āsate / 
sattvasyāpi tatra bhāvāt kasyāṃcid avasthāyāṃ sukhaleśam api bhuñjate / (Jhā 1999a, 30, lines 2-3). 
36
 I don‟t mean to imply here that killing an entity allows it to avoid the suffering it would have 
experienced. A standard view is that this suffering is moral desert, and hence that the entity will 
experience it in the next life. 
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being alive explains the emphasis on the blameworthiness of killing, including killing 
that does not increase overall pain. 
 By itself, however, the criterion of being alive is problematic as well. One of the 
more obvious problems is that the reduction of the value and disvalue of pleasure and 
pain to the value and disvalue of life and death seems implausible. Suppose, for 
example, that a person has a chronic disease that causes a great deal of pain. Even if 
there‟s nothing we can do to prolong her life, we should minimize her pain. If all that 
matters is the avoidance of death, however, then attempts to minimize her pain should 
be abandoned with the attempts to prolong her life. Indeed, we should at no point 
bother to minimize her pain unless there is reason to think it will prolong her life. 
 Another way to put this point is to say that there‟s reason to think that pleasure 
and pain have value and disvalue in themselves, regardless of their contribution to the 
length of a person‟s life. This is Perrett‟s point in the quotation above. According to 
certain Indian texts and traditions, liberation is valuable in part because it is 
pleasurable and devoid of pain. Hence pleasure and the avoidance of pain are 
intrinsically valuable. The criterion of being alive, by itself, does not account for this. 
 So rather than choosing between the two criteria, both might be adopted. Certain 
Indian texts and traditions ascribe intrinsic value and direct moral standing to plants 
and animals both because they are sentient, and because they are alive. Hence certain 
Indian texts and traditions provide the basis for an environmental ethic. 
 There are still at least two problems with the combined account. The first is that 
since lower animals and plants are not in fact sentient, the account is implausible 
insofar as it attributes intrinsic value and direct moral standing to lower animals and 
plants because they are sentient. So on the combined account, lower animals and 
plants have intrinsic value and direct moral standing solely because they are alive. If 
this is right, then lower animals and plants can be treated in whatever way one 
chooses, so long as their lives are not shortened. If it turns out that fish are non-
sentient, for example, then there is no reason to leave salmon runs open, rather than 
round them up in pools, where they are fed and allowed to mate. The combined 
account offers no plausible explanation for the wrongness of such actions.  
 Second, the combined account cannot explain the intuition that sentient beings 
can be harmed even if neither their longevity nor their overall happiness is 
diminished. Imagine that lead poisoning will not compromise a child‟s longevity or 
overall happiness. The child will have a mild learning disability, but will be no less 
happy overall. The combined account has no resource for explaining why the 
diminution in the child‟s mental capacities is of disvalue. Yet it is. 
A final alternative – and the one I favor – is to interpret these texts as attributing 
intrinsic value and direct moral standing to certain beings in virtue of their having a 
good.
37
 Human beings, along with animals and plants, can either flourish or languish. 
                                                 
37
 The word „good‟ here is shorthand for „good of its own‟. Taylor explains that the difference between 
living beings and artifacts is that the artifacts‟ goods “ultimately refer to the goals their human 
producers had in mind when they made [them].” (They might also simply refer to the goals that the 
artifacts‟ users ascribe to them.) The goods of living beings, in contrast, are “inherent to them,” that is, 
they are independent of the intentions of other entities (Taylor 1986, 124). 
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If something can flourish or languish, then it must have some optimum state. 
Movement towards the optimum state amounts to flourishing, movement away from 
the optimum state amounts to languishing. This optimum state is the entity‟s good.38 
 The distinction between flourishing and languishing covers both the criterion of 
sentience and the criterion of being alive, since any plausible characterization of the 
distinction between flourishing and languishing will refer to longevity, and any 
plausible characterization of flourishing and languishing in sentient beings will refer 
to pleasure and pain. So the criterion of having a good exhibits the benefits of the 
combined account.  
The criterion of having a good is also no more controversial than the combined 
account. While it covers both the criterion of sentience and the criterion of being 
alive, it leaves open the possibility that an entity‟s good is more complex than this, 
without asserting that it certainly is.  
At the same time, it seems certain that the good of human beings is not reducible 
to being alive, avoiding pain, and experiencing pleasure. It also seems certain that the 
Hindu traditions acknowledge this. There is little reason to think that the Manusmṛti’s 
prescriptions of Vedic studentship, monogamous marriage, the performance of rituals, 
dutiful childrearing, retirement to the forest, and so on can be explained entirely in 
terms of the longevity and balance of pleasure over pain to which these practices lead 
(other than the assumption at the outset that the worldview is hedonistic). A more 
plausible interpretation is that these practices lead to a human life of flourishing 
broadly construed; in raising children, a person flourishes, but not just by increasing 
his or her longevity and long-term balance of pleasure over pain. If a human being‟s 
good is not reducible to being alive, avoiding pain, and experiencing pleasure, then 
perhaps the goods of non-human beings are not reducible either.  
Another benefit of this criterion is that it leaves open the question of what, other 
than being alive, avoiding pain, and experiencing pleasure, constitutes a specific 
entity‟s good – if anything does. This standpoint is appropriate, given the ongoing 
debate among philosophers of science, environmental ethicists, ecologists, and others 
over how to determine an entity‟s good. It is also appropriate given the relative 
infancy of the field of Hindu environmental ethics, which has yet to consider these 
questions carefully.  
 Additionally, the final account is well-supported by the nearly pan-Indian cardinal 
virtue of ahiṃsā. The term is usually translated as „non-violence‟ or „non-harm‟. The 
latter translation is often favored because of its breadth; the word „non-violence‟ often 
suggests physical or explicit harm, whereas ahiṃsā refers to the avoidance of any 
harm whatever – even if that harm is neither painful, nor life-shortening. Theft, for 
example, constitutes a harm even if it is never discovered, and even if the stolen item 
would never have benefited its original owner. The same is true for harms of 
deception, coercion, and so on. If an entity can be harmed without causing it pain or 
                                                 
38
 This kind of argument is advanced by Taylor (1986), O‟Neill (1992), Rolston (1994), Norton (1984), 
Lee (1996), and many others. The claim that certain living beings have a good is controversial, 
however. I deal with these issues in another paper in progress. 
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shortening its life, however, then its good is not exhausted by longevity, the 
avoidance of pain, and the experience of pleasure. 
The criterion also avoids the objections mentioned above. Even harms that are 
neither painful nor life shortening have disvalue, simply in virtue of being harms that 
cause the being to languish rather than flourish in other ways. This is most obvious in 
the case of human beings. 
 Lastly, the criterion of having a good avoids the implication that all things are 
equally valuable. Anything that is not alive, and lacks a good, lacks intrinsic value 
and direct moral standing. Hence the account I outline avoids the vacuity objection. 
There might seem to be additional counter-intuitive consequences to this view, such 
as the equal intrinsic value and direct moral standing of all living beings (since all 
have a good). Nothing I have said here entails this, however. It might be, for example, 
that an entity has some amount of intrinsic value in virtue of having a good, but that 
the amount of intrinsic value nonetheless varies, as a result, for example, of varying 
capacities and potentials.
39
  
 If all living entities have a good, and if all entities that have a good have intrinsic 
value and direct moral standing, (and if the vacuity objection is avoided,) then certain 
Hindu texts and traditions – the Manusmṛti and many texts and traditions that share 
its views – do provide the basis for an environmental ethic.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
Arguments that cite some kind of identity between nature and God in support of the 
conclusion that certain Hindu texts and traditions provide the basis for an 
environmental ethic are not convincing. Some of these texts and traditions do provide 
the basis for an environmental ethic, however. They ascribe intrinsic value and direct 
moral standing to all living beings, in virtue of their having a good.   
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ABSTRACT: Critical engagement involving philosophers trained in continental and 
analytic traditions often takes its purpose to be a reconciliation of tensions arising from 
differences in style, or method. Critical engagement in Africana philosophy, however, is 
rarely focused on method, style, or orientation because philosophic research in this field, 
regardless of orientation, has had to accommodate its empirical grounding in disciplines 
outside of philosophy. I focus primarily on the comparative dimensions of three important 
strands of this research: (1) a history of ideas, (2) a problem-orientation, and (3) a sub-area 
specialization, to indicate why a need to reconcile tensions between continental and analytic 
orientations has very little currency in Africana philosophy. Socio-economic problems faced 
by African-descended people require multiple perspectives to accommodate the wide variety 
of diasporic social contexts for a given proposal. I employ a selection of cases to illustrate 
how Africana philosophy benefits from an interplay of many intersecting factors and that, as 
an interdisciplinary area of research with a commitment to the incorporation of multiple 
perspectives, it fosters cross-pollination and hybridization of continental and 
analytic traditions. 
Keywords: comparative philosophy, Africana, interdisciplinary 
 
Long before Africana Philosophy gained official recognition by the American 
Philosophical Association as an area of study within the discipline, Western 
philosophy already had jelled into a rigid divide between continental and analytic 
schools. (Quinton, 1995) The engagement of continental and analytic philosophers 
interested in Africana thought suggests a model of how multifarious differences can 
be negotiated to mutual benefit. Although the term ―comparative philosophy‖ often is 
based on comparisons between Eastern and Western philosophy, it is also sometimes 
meant to refer to comparisons between different orientations within these. (Mou, 
2010) I consider several dimensions of such comparisons, with special emphasis on 
the interplay between various modes of philosophical examination and empirical 
inquiry.  
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There are many well-established applied areas in philosophy, such as philosophy 
of language, education, law, and science, in which philosophical thinking is brought 
to bear on questions that arise within one of these disciplines. Some areas in 
philosophy, such as epistemology and aesthetics, have generated theories that have 
been applied in other applied areas such as philosophy of perception and philosophy 
of art. I mention these applications of philosophy to other disciplines to point out that 
the overlap of philosophical concerns with empirical-contingent matters suggests a 
need to include the latter component (of many areas of philosophy) in the 
conceptualization of the purpose of a comparison between different traditions. The 
idea of critical engagement between continental and analytic traditions often takes, as 
its purpose, a reconciliation of tensions arising from differences in style, or method. 
In this regard it is important to consider the extent to which interdisciplinary 
formations such as Marxist Studies, Cultural Studies, Ethnic Studies, Peasant Studies, 
and Post-colonial Studies have provided a basis for the emergence of new areas in 
philosophy, such as Africana and Native American philosophy. Given that the need to 
reconcile tension between continental and analytic orientations has had very little 
currency in these instances, the term ―critical engagement‖ is somewhat misleading. 
Critical engagement in Africana philosophy is rarely focused on method, style, or 
orientation because philosophic research in this field, regardless of orientation, has 
had to accommodate its empirical grounding in disciplines outside of philosophy. 
Rather than increasing tensions, this interdisciplinary feature has facilitated 
coalescence and hybridization of the two schools.                                           
This coalescence is especially noticeable in the attempt, by contemporary 
philosophers, to articulate philosophical views found in traditional African cultures. 
Despite strong parallels with Native American philosophy, the suggestion that a 
philosophic discourse existed in ancient Africa has engendered an extensive debate 
within African philosophy regarding the definition of philosophy. (Brandt, 1954; 
Ladd, 1957; Appiah, 1992; Oruka, 1990; Hountondji, 1983) Differences in style, or 
method, between continental and analytic philosophy, however, have not been an 
issue in this debate. This is due mainly to the fact that the study of traditional African 
philosophy has been pursued by Western-trained philosophers, representing both 
orientations. (Wiredu, 1980; Hallen and Sodipo, 1986; Oruka, 1990)  
The study of traditional African philosophy is one of several strands of Africana 
philosophy engendered by interdisciplinary research that has played an important role 
as a primary source for the study of Africana thought. I focus primarily on a history 
of ideas, a problem-orientation, and a sub-area specialization as three important 
strands. Many topics in Africana philosophy are related to socio-economic problems 
faced by African-descended people throughout the diaspora, requiring multiple 
perspectives to accommodate the wide variety of social contexts (that include Latin 
America and Europe, along with Africa, the United States and the Caribbean) in 
which a given proposal will have different renderings. I highlight the manner in 
which Africana philosophy has benefited from the interplay of many intersecting 
factors. In particular, I indicate how, due to its inherently interdisciplinary nature, 
Africana philosophy is also inherently pluralistic, and that, as an area within the 
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discipline, it came into being as a joint product of cross-pollination of continental and 
analytic traditions.   
The topics I discuss below represent my focus on the three strands I have 
identified above. They are drawn from African, Afro-Caribbean, and African 
American philosophy to represent specialists from different sub-areas and to include 
continental and analytic traditions. In various ways, the selected topics illustrate how 
insights advanced by continental and analytic philosophers alike have jointly 
enhanced our understanding of central questions in the field. They also illustrate how 
the interdisciplinary nature of Africana thought provides a source for philosophical 
ideas. Whether they are dealing with questions pertaining to language and meaning, 
ontology and epistemology, or to social and political values, philosophers 
representing both orientations have been concerned with the formulation of problems, 
the clarification of key concepts, the generation of pertinent issues, and the 
assessment of arguments for, or against, various proposals. In the cases I consider, 
this rather pragmatic concern with practical matters, and the high value placed on the 
generation of ideas, issues, or insights, that shed light on the question at hand, 
overrides concerns regarding orientation, method, or style. Discussions of differences 
in style, method, or orientation have not gained priority over discussions of ideas that 
advance thinking about a given problem.  At this stage of its emergence, ideas and 
method have pride of place in Africana philosophic research. 
I first consider a selection of topics that have been addressed across differences in 
socio-historical contexts, sub-area specialization, and philosophical orientations to 
indicate how various subjects have been enhanced by multiple perspectives reflecting 
these differences. I next consider the role of continental and analytic philosophers in 
the development of a canon in the field, to show how the development of Africana 
philosophy has been a joint undertaking. Finally, I turn to consider a turn-of-the-
century, African American philosopher, Alain Locke, to draw attention to the two 
versions of his dissertation as a methodological paradigm of how to navigate the 
continental-analytic divide by mastering both styles. The comparative aspects I 
discuss involve many areas where Africana philosophy overlaps and intersects with 
other disciplines, as well as with various areas in mainstream and non-Western 
philosophy. With an eye to these intersections, I indicate the extent to which, in the 
case of Africana philosophy, critical engagement is multi-faceted. 
 
1. CROSS-CURRENTS WITHIN AFRICANAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
Cultural differences associated with geographic location have fostered a discourse in 
Africana philosophy representing multiple perspectives that aim to shed light on 
problems shared throughout the African diaspora. As a common source for a history 
of ideas, continental and analytic philosophers alike have devoted careful scrutiny to 
views published by ex-slaves, by black abolitionists and emigrationists, by Pan-
Africanists, and by philosophers concerned with the impact of modernization on 
traditional aesthetics and cultural values.  
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Slave narratives were written by Africans, such as Olaudah Equiano, Afro-
Caribbeans, such as Mary Prince, and African Americans, such as Frederick 
Douglass. (Equiano, 1789; Prince, 1831; Douglass, 1848) In each case basic 
questions regarding human freedom, rights and dignity are raised, yet the predicament 
of slaves in each sociohistorical context is quite different. These basic questions are 
taken to be universal and to transcend the different contexts within the diaspora. For 
this reason, the discussion of slave narratives, and other writings by ex-slaves, in 
Africana philosophy has included specialists in all three sub-areas representing 
continental and analytic traditions.  
A topic’s status as universal is sometimes ambiguous, as when a proposal that has 
been advanced to deal with a particular problem in a specific context seems to be at 
odds with what is proposed in a different social context. For example, in his well-
known 1897 address to the Negro Academy on the conservation of races W.E.B. Du 
Bois introduced the Hegelian notion of double consciousness to argue that African 
Americans have a duty to retain their cultural identity. (Du Bois, 1897) His view of 
development and social progress is thoroughly imbued with, and deeply influenced 
by, a wide reading in continental philosophy. In particular, he displays his 
background in American pragmatism and German philosophy when he deconstructs 
the biological notion of race and proposes a reconstruction along the lines of culture.  
In his recent book, Tradition and Modernity (1997), Kwame Gyekye argues, in 
analytic fashion, that individuals in African societies have a duty to transcend their 
specific cultural identities in support of a national culture. When taken together, the 
positions advocated by Du Bois and Gyekye seem to entail mutually exclusive 
imperatives that are context-specific. Indeed, there seems to be a tension between Du 
Bois’s view that, in the American context of white domination, there is an imperative 
for African Americans to retain their distinctive Africana culture and Gyekye’s view 
that, in the African context, there is an imperative for members of different ethnic 
groups to adopt a national culture. The former promotes black pride to counter the 
negative effects of America’s legal segregation, whereas the latter promotes national 
unity by permiting individuals in African societies to adopt a national identity that 
transcends having specific ethnic identities. A two-phase account is needed to resolve 
the seeming inconsistency between these two views of cultural pluralism and social 
progress. Du Bois and Geyekye are not in disagreement given that, for both, only 
with the elimination of racial, or ethnic, domination can the option to transcend one’s 
specific ethnic identity be exercised. From the standpoint of the continental-analytic 
divide this seems to be a case in which the viewpoint of an African American 
specialist, trained in continental philosophy, is contrary to the viewpoint of an African 
specialist with an analytic orientation. Notice that each viewpoint is important to 
consider and that, by contextualizing the problem, both proposals advance our 
understanding of the issues.    
Some apparent differences in doctrine that, perhaps, have been influenced by 
diaspora location and sociohistorical context, cannot be so easily resolved. These 
differences are reflected in some of the nineteenth-century debates regarding 
emigrationism. Although the idea that ex-slaves would have to leave America to gain 
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social equality was advocated by African Americans, such as Mary Ann Shadd-Carey 
and Martin Delany, their views were remarkably different from views held by Afro-
Caribbean thinkers such as Edwin Blyden and Marcus Garvey. (Delany, 1849; Shadd-
Carey, 1852; Garvey, 1923) These African American thinkers were less enamored 
with returning to Africa, often proposing Canada, Mexico and Haiti as possible sites, 
whereas the Afro-Caribbean thinkers I cite insisted upon a return to Africa as a 
necessary condition for emigration. Ideological differences of this sort, however, may 
not be influenced so much by diaspora-location as they are a reflection of the 
ambivalence prevalent throughout the diaspora towards Africa as a homeland for 
descendants.    
For many reasons, the much-contested African-centered nationalism in Africana 
thought displays the influence of sociohistorical context. Toward the end of the 
nineteenth century, at the height of colonialism in Africa, some version of pan-
Africanism was widely supported by a vast majority of black intellectuals throughout 
the diaspora. Despite the popularity of Marcus Garvey in the 1920s, in post-colonial 
Africa, with the exception of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, it was never widely 
embraced by African heads of state. Representing a line of thought that is specific to 
the African American context, Tommie Shelby has proposed to replace the notion of 
an African-centered cultural nationalism with a notion of black solidarity that he 
maintains is more pragmatic for African Americans. (Shelby, 2005) His revised 
notion is suited to focus strictly on ending antiblack racism in America without a 
commitment to maintaining Africana cultures. Although disagreement among 
philosophers on issues pertaining to nationalism and culture is, undoubtedly, 
influenced by many factors, sociohistorical context is often a determinant. While a 
proponent’s philosophic orientation is relevant to understanding her method of 
arriving at a certain position, as well as her grounds for maintaining it, cross-currents 
involving these orientations have combined with other factors to generate new lines 
of thought that yield new insights, and new debates.   
 
2. SHAPING THE CANON: CROSS-POLLINATING  
CONTINENTAL AND ANALYTIC TRADITIONSS 
 
Some of the cross-currents that give rise to multiple perspectives on topics shared 
throughout the diaspora also have contributed to the establishment of a canon that 
includes classic texts commonly referenced by philosophers interested in a thinker’s 
ideas, or in a particular subject. The examples I cite below involve the treatment of a 
subject from multiple perspectives by sub-area specialists and the interpretation of a 
thinker’s ideas by philosophers representing both traditions.  
Questions regarding the moral and political grounds of slavery and colonialism 
have been a source of philosophical reflection in Western philosophy since the time 
of the Greeks. (Williams, 1993) In Africana philosophy, a critical examination of 
these subjects has been undertaken by continental and analytic philosophers 
throughout the diaspora. Almost everyone versed in Africana thought is familiar with 
C.L.R. James’s classic social and political account of the Haitian revolution in The 
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Black Jacobins (1938). Hardly anyone knows, however, that it was presaged by Anna 
Julia Cooper’s lesser known French-language doctoral dissertation in 1925. Cooper 
was an ex-slave who earned her undergraduate degree at Oberlin in 1887 and her 
doctorate at the Sorbonne in 1925. She is better-known for her classic feminist text, A 
Voice From the South (1892). James was a Marxist historian, well-known for his 
theoretical writings in political theory, especially his unpublished Notes on Dialectics 
(1948) and his masterpiece in social history, Beyond A Boundary (1963). Cooper’s 
analysis of the Haitian revolution relies on French Enlightenment philosophy to 
account for the ideological grounding of slave resistance, whereas James’s Marxist 
analysis casts a skeptical glance at that tradition. Along with a comparison of an 
African-American female ex-slave viewpoint with an Afro-Caribbean Marxist male 
viewpoint as a complex set of factors influencing the respective accounts, in this case, 
multiple perspectives also include - as a factor equally influencing their views - the 
Anglophone context for James’s book and the Francophone context for Cooper’s 
dissertation. Whichever factors we choose to account for differences in their 
respective analyses notwithstanding, these two philosophers represent 
interdisciplinary thinkers, each with a strong background in continental philosophy, 
who have advanced our thinking about a central topic in Africana philosophy. 
Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth is another classic text in Africana 
philosophy. In Fanon and the Crisis of European Man (1995), Lewis Gordon, an 
Afro-Caribbean specialist, employs his training in continental philosophy, specifically 
Husserl’s phenomenology, to interpret Fanon’s thought. Analytic philosophers, such 
as Bernard Boxill, have also presented interpretations of Fanon’s text. Boxill, a 
specialist in African American philosophy, extracts a line of reasoning from Wretched 
of the Earth to spell out a moral argument regarding protest and self-respect. (Boxill, 
1976) A quite different reading is presented by Nigerian philosopher, Oladipo 
Fashina. He presents a logically rigorous version of an argument in Fanon’s text that 
represents a non-humanistic line of thought. (Fashina, 1989) In this case,  
philosophers representing multiple perspectives, and trained in both traditions, have 
reflected upon a classic work in continental philosophy by a Francophone Afro-
Caribbean philosopher, and have arrived at quite different interpretations.  
 
3. ALAIN LOCKE’S DISSERTATION ON VALUES:  
MERGING CONTINENTAL AND ANALYTIC TRADITIONS 
 
Around the turn of the century, before the rise of logical positivism and the influence 
of the Vienna Circle on Anglo-American philosophers, W.E.B. Du Bois and Alain 
Locke were studying at European universities. (Quinton, 1995) While at Harvard both 
were students of the well-known American pragmatist, William James. Pragmatism, 
as a school of thought associated with American philosophers influenced by Charles 
Peirce, John Dewey, as well as James, has broadly appealed to continental and 
analytic philosophers alike. James stands out, with his experimental research in 
psychology, as an interdisciplinary thinker. In turn, James, an empirical scientist, was 
influenced by French philosopher, Henri Bergson.  The reason for James’s high 
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regard in both traditions, however, was not his scientific, or continental, leanings. 
Rather, his broad appeal is due more to his influence on two of the twentieth-
century’s greatest philosophers – Edmund Husserl and Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
Research in Africana philosophy on two of James’s students, Du Bois and Locke, 
reflects these historical traces of American Pragmatism on  continental and analytic 
traditions.  
As a Rhodes scholar at Oxford Locke wrote a dissertation on value theory that 
displayed the influence of James’ teachings regarding the centrality of experience. 
Other than James, almost all of his sources were early twentieth-century continental 
philosophers, including Franz Brentano and Alexius Meinong. He mailed his 
dissertation to Oxford from Berlin, where he actually had written it during the spring 
and summer of 1910. Having begun coursework toward earning a doctorate at the 
University of Berlin, he attended the lectures of many distinguished German 
philosophers, including Georg Simmel, and Ernst Cassirer. (Harris and Molesworth, 
2008) Locke’s thesis was not accepted for several reasons. Most notable was his 
misfortune of having the logician, J. Cook Wilson, assigned to read it. When financial 
concerns became paramount, and Locke was unable to complete his doctorate at the 
University of Berlin, he accepted a teaching position at Howard University in 
Washington, D.C.    
Several years later, in 1917, he wrote another version of his Oxford thesis to 
satisfy requirements for a doctorate at Harvard. As an undergraduate at Harvard (and 
later at the University of Berlin) he had studied with Hugo Meunsterber. Another of 
his undergraduate teachers, Ralph Barton Perry, a specialist working in value theory, 
was his thesis advisor. Needless to say, Perry was much more suitable to read Locke’s 
dissertation – especially so, given Locke’s psychological focus on valuation. In the 
Harvard dissertation, Locke transformed his original tome, ―A Genetic Theory of 
Value‖, which was lucidly written in a continental style, into a somewhat less 
ambitious analytic project, ―A Classification of Values.‖ What is important to note 
here is that, he learned from his experience with Cook at Oxford how better to 
negotiate his decidedly continental orientation with Perry’s analytic leanings. The 
second version of his dissertation was a hybrid of continental and analytic 
philosophy.  
Given the hegemony of analytic philosophers in many departments, as well as 
throughout the professional organizations, the practice of recasting insights derived 
from continental philosophy into an analytic mode of discourse is a familiar means of 
negotiating the continental-analytic divide. While most philosophers interested in 
Africana thought are trained specifically in one of the two traditions, the audience for 
their work represents both orientations. The fact that many of the major Africana 
philosophers, such as Cooper, Du Bois, Locke, James, and Fanon, represent the 
continental tradition is an advantage for continental philosophers and indirectly 
fosters pluralism in the study of Africana philosophy. The merit of this inherent 
tendency toward pluralism cannot be overstated. For, an important lesson to be 
garnered from the two versions of Locke’s dissertation on values is that, on this 
particular subject, a wholly analytic, or continental, treatment is inadequate.  
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Locke’s project on values was directly related to his later writings on aesthetics, 
art and music, for which he is much better known. In his self-proclaimed role as 
―mid-wife‖ to the Harlem Renaissance writers and artists he is acknowledged by 
Amie Cesaire and Leopold Senghor to have inspired the Negritude movement. 
(Kennedy, 1972; Senghor, 1977) Although this movement originated in the American 
context, it gained momentum mostly in Francophone regions of the Caribbean and 
Africa. Many questions regarding aesthetics are culturally specific. However, in the 
case of Negritude, differences in cultural values, influenced by socio-historical 
context, did not hinder proponents from claiming a cross-cultural application of their 
ideas throughout the diaspora. It is noteworthy that, although topics related to 
Negritude also raise important issues of great interest to analytic philosophers, even 
in its earliest American stage during the Harlem Renaissance, the movement was an 
interdisciplinary project involving philosophers who were grounded mainly in 
continental philosophy. (Sartre, 1948; Senghor, 1977; Bernasconi, 2001)  
 
4. CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND INTERDISCIPLINARY CONCERNS 
 
The need for critical engagement to bridge the continental-analytic divide is fairly 
non-existent in the case of Africana philosophy because often the two styles are 
immersed in cross-dialogue with a focus on the question at hand - rendering concerns 
about orientation, or style, less important.  In addition to this pragmatic factor, I want 
to suggest a more fundamental reason having to do with the interdisciplinary nature 
of Africana philosophy. With a focus on some of the major strands of Africana 
philosophy, I have already cited above examples of critical engagement involving 
exchanges between philosophers representing both orientations and specialization in 
the sub-areas. I have also cited examples of critical engagement involving exchanges 
between philosophers within each of the two schools regarding the interpretation of a 
classic text. I will conclude with a consideration of intersections with various 
disciplines to acknowledge comparative aspects of Africana philosophy that involve 
overlap with interdisciplinary studies, e.g., Ethnic, Post-colonial, or Women’s 
Studies; with other areas of Western philosophy, e.g., Marxism, Latin American, or 
feminism; or with Non-Western philosophy, e.g., Asian, or Native American. 
The relation of Africana philosophy to other disciplines indicates a structural 
basis for the cross-dialogue between continental and analytic philosophers. The 
empirical circumstances of African people throughout the diaspora accounts for the 
social and political focus—specifically on socioeconomic problems—in Africana 
philosophy. Various disciplines in the social sciences, along with history, literature, 
art, and music are best suited to study and establish a body of empirical knowledge 
regarding these contingent matters. Africana philosophy draws upon all of these 
disciplines, but so do other categories of interdisciplinary studies, such as Women’s, 
Ethnic, Cultural, and Post-colonial Studies. Indeed, many subjects in Africana 
philosophy often have been topics of prior debates in Africana thought generally, or 
subjects previously discussed in related disciplines. In this important respect Africana 
philosophy overlaps other disciplines and is inherently interdisciplinary.  
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 There is a great deal of research, pursued in other disciplines, that involves a 
critical examination of issues pertaining to racism, slavery, and colonial oppression. 
Just as scholars in those disciplines have not established an exclusive claim on these 
subjects, neither have philosophers who address issues of specific concern to 
philosophers, for empirical findings that have a bearing on their philosophic concerns 
cannot be ignored. For this reason, debates and exchanges within Africana philosophy 
are not limited to the multiple perspectives influenced by, and reflecting, socio-
historical context, area of specialization and continental-analytic orientation. On 
many topics such as race, affirmative action, criminal justice, punishment, health 
care, welfare rights and reparations, Africana philosophy also critically engages many 
mainstream philosophic concerns related to policy.  
This engagement can, in some cases, be a direct challenge to a view that is well-
regarded in mainstream philosophy. An example of this would be Kawasi Wiredu’s 
appeal to the conceptualization of truth in his native Akan language to question 
whether Alfred Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is universal. (Wiredu, 1980) Unlike 
this philosophy of language case, involving a well-known philosopher’s theory of 
truth, more often this engagement is in the manner of applied philosophy. In these 
latter cases some subject outside of philosophy is critically examined by philosophers. 
For example, social scientists, such as Orlando Patterson and historians such as 
Eugene Genovese have been challenged by philosophers on their views of the 
injustice of slavery. (Lott, 1998; Mc Gary, 1992) Relying on liberal democratic 
notions of paternalism and social justice, philosophers have raised questions 
regarding the social and political implications of empirical accounts by social 
scientists and historians.  
In certain instances of mainstream-Africana engagement, philosophers employ the 
views of historical European philosophers to interpret an Africana thinker, or text.  
Sometimes the aim is to establish a direct parallel. This strategy is employed by Jill 
Gordon in her comparative analysis of Malcom X’s ―Ballot or the Bullet‖ speech and 
John Locke’s teachings on resistance in the Second Treatise. (Gordon, 1995) It is also 
employed by Julie Ward in her comparative analysis of arguments against slavery by 
Olaudah Equiano and Ottobah Cugoano in which she traces many of their ideas to 
views expressed in the writings of specific European Enlightenment thinkers such as 
Granville Sharp, Thomas Clarkson, and James Ramsay. (Ward, 1998)  
Sometimes the aim of Africana-mainstream critical engagement is to appropriate 
and employ an argument, or line of reasoning, that can be found in a European 
philosopher’s text. In her lecture on Douglass’s slave narrative, Angela Davis 
employs Hegel’s master-slave parable to interpret the shift in Douglass’ 
consciousness that motivated his quest for freedom. (Harris, 1983) In a similar 
fashion, Bernard Boxill develops an argument for reparations based on John Locke’s 
view in the Second Treatise. (Boxill, 2003) What should be noted here is that Davis’s 
continental orientation and Boxill’s analytic style are equally important modes of 
arriving at insights that shed light, respectively, on Douglass’s text and the subject of 
reparations.  
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The comparative aspects of Africana philosophy I have cited indicate the extent to 
which continental and analytic traditions have been equally important to the growth 
and development of this emerging field. No special claim is being made for Africana 
philosophy in this regard, for other areas within the discipline may also represent 
similar contributions by representatives of both traditions. The domination of analytic 
philosophy by logical positivism and linguistics and continental philosophy by 
phenomenology and hermeneutics is reminiscent of tensions between rationalists and 
empiricists in modern philosophy resulting from their different views of the role of 
reason and sense perception in epistemology. What has gone unremarked in both 
cases is the extent to which the respective views bleed into each other, resulting in 
hybridization on both sides. Whether this bleeding process entitles us to speak of a 
―merging‖ of the two traditions is an empirical question to be decided by future 
developments within the field. 
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There has been a great deal of discussion about whether early (pre-Buddhist) Chinese 
philosophers had a concept of truth. Much of this debate has been weighed down by 
the problematic assumption that the property expressed by the predicate „is true‟, (or 
by any predicate in Chinese that roughly corresponds to the predicate in English „is 
true‟) is something like correspondence between truth-apt propositions and “states-of-
affairs”, and that any candidate concept in early Chinese philosophy for “truth” thus 
must express such a property. Generally, when scholars have shown a particular 
thinker or school within the Chinese tradition to be concerned with properties of 
sentences, names, teachings, propositions, or whatever bit of language is being 
considered, or when it is conceded that a particular thinker did have a conception of 
truth, they have taken him as primarily concerned with pragmatic properties of 
linguistic structures, such as “assertability” or usefulness for social `harmony, etc., 
rather than correspondence properties,
1
 and have concluded that these thinkers were 
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either not interested in (or had no concept of) truth, or had a pragmatist conception of 
truth.
2
 
This assumption is false, and misses something important about the philosophy of 
language and metaphysics in the work of classical Chinese thinkers. The predicate „is 
true‟ does not have to be understood as expressing a correspondence property—
indeed, the numerous debates within philosophy of language and metaphysics that 
rage today are over whether there is any property of truth at all, and if so what that 
property is. So it is far from obvious that any Chinese concept that can be understood 
as a concept of truth must be “truth as correspondence”. To hold this would simply be 
to deny that coherentists, pragmatists about truth, or deflationists (who reject any 
metaphysical property associated with the predicate „is true‟) are really talking about 
truth when they theorize about truth.  Even if these philosophers are ultimately wrong 
about truth, it is wrong to say that they‟re not offering theories of truth.  Likewise, in 
considering the early Chinese philosophers, we should be open to the possibility that 
they were operating with a conception of truth different from that of a correspondence 
theorist. Perhaps they were pragmatists, for example, and simply thought of the 
Chinese equivalents of „is true‟ [such as ran (然), shi (是), you (有), shi (實), etc.] as 
expressing pragmatic properties. 
I do not think, however, that this was the case. I believe it can be useful to see 
some of the early Chinese philosophers as pluralists about truth. That is, „is true,‟ 
according to these thinkers, expresses different properties in different linguistic 
contexts. In some contexts the predicate „is true‟ (然 ran, 實 shi, or whatever is 
playing the role of the truth predicate for the particular philosopher) might express the 
property of something like correspondence between sentences and states of affairs, 
                                                                                                                                                              
1
 That is, correspondence theory as an account of relations between propositions and states-of-affairs, 
not what we might call correspondence-truth in a folk theoretical sense, or what we might call the 
“correspondence intuition”, that what is true must mirror in some sense the way things are. 
2
 This is not true across the board, however. David Hall and Roger Ames argue in the above way (see 
Ames and Hall, 1998, Part 2), as does Chad Hansen, while Bryan Van Norden, for example, rejects 
this view. Van Norden‟s arguments are also problematic, however, as he seems to share the “truth as 
correspondence” assumption, and instead takes the tactic of denying that the early philosophers were 
primarily interested in pragmatic properties, but were indeed interested in something like 
correspondence. In specific, Van Norden claims that the early philosophers were concerned about truth 
because the predicate (specifically, ran) he identifies with „is true‟ operates in the way dictated by 
Tarski‟s T-schema—that for any sentence x, „x‟ is true iff x—where the single quoted use of x is an 
occurrence in the object language and everything else is in the metalanguage. I believe that, unless the 
early philosophers were something like deflationists and thought there was nothing more to truth than 
this rule of the operation of the predicate ran, this cannot have been enough to define a concept of 
truth. The fact that they do, and Wang Chong certainly does, offer a more robust conception of truth 
than the simple semantic rule account, shows us that they had a different conception of truth than that 
of contemporary deflationists.  Most importantly, the T-schema does not commit one to anything like 
correspondence (although proponents of deflationism might argue that it does account for the folk 
correspondence intuition). A truth predicate will obey the T-schema even if the truth predicate is 
robustly pragmatic, having nothing at all to do with the “way the world is.” Thus the T-schema can‟t 
serve as a kind of “thin” conception of correspondence, or as a way to make sense of a folk conception 
of correspondence between statements and reality. 
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and in other contexts
3
 „is true‟ 4  might express the property of assertability or 
usefulness to advance social harmony.   
Below I argue that the Eastern Han dynasty philosopher Wang Chong‟s (c. 25-
100 CE) conception of 實  shi in the Lun-Heng can be profitably and plausibly 
interpreted as a concept of truth unifying different properties in different linguistic 
contexts. The pluralist conception of truth arising from Wang‟s work differs 
significantly from contemporary pluralist theories of truth on a number of issues. The 
points of difference between these theories can be highly instructive in helping us 
understand the purpose and acceptability of pluralism about truth and the concept of 
truth in general, and as such can contribute to the contemporary debate about truth.  I 
begin by discussing three different contemporary pluralist views of truth. In section 1, 
then continue to discuss the concept of shi and its evolution through early Chinese 
history in section 2. In section 3 I demonstrate the plausibility of reading Wang‟s 
Lun-Heng as offering a pluralist conception of truth which lends itself to a particular 
explication and development, and I show how such a pluralist theory can both inform 
the contemporary debate surrounding truth and pluralism and help us understand how 
early Chinese philosophers in general thought about truth. 
 
1. COMTEMPORARY THEORIES OF ALETHIC PLURALISM 
 
Pluralism about truth, or alethic pluralism, is relatively recent to the contemporary 
(post 20
th
 century) debate about truth, although it has predecessors throughout the 
history of western philosophy, and, I will argue below, in the history of Chinese 
philosophy (as well as the classical Indian tradition, where the Buddhist “two truths” 
view is an example
5
). 
Contemporary pluralist theories of truth can generally be seen as a reaction to the 
perceived failure of “monist” theories of truth. Monist theories of truth generally take 
the concept of truth to express a particular single property belonging to certain 
linguistic entities—whether propositions, sentences, statements, or something else6.  
                                                        
3
 Or “discourses”, or “domains”. Philosophers discussing pluralist theories of truth have spoken in both 
ways. Michael Lynch speaks of “domains” (Lynch 2009), while Crispin Wright, (Wright 1992) speaks 
of “practices”. Lynch says, in a statement of his functionalist pluralism: “For atomic propositions, 
ontologically distinct manifestations of truth are manifestations relative to a domain…a proposition is 
true because it has the further property that manifests truth for that domain.” (Lynch 2009, p. 76) 
4
 Or shi, ran, etc.—as I will argue below the variety of terms used to capture something like “truth” 
which are all functionally very similar are unified in Wang Chong‟s use of shi as a catch-all and 
something like an explanation of a functional concept operative in all linguistic contexts in which there 
can be truth-apt statements, teachings, etc.   
5
 The “two truths” view is that there are two levels of truth, relative truth and ultimate truth, and that 
some propositions or statements might be true in one sense but not the other, but that it is justified to 
call a statement meeting the normative objectives of one or other of these levels “true” (sat).  For a 
good philosophical exposition of the “two truths” theory see Siderits 2003, ch. 8. 
6
 There has been debate over what kinds of entities are “truth-apt”, which goes beyond the scope of this 
paper, and this debate connects closely to that over truth itself, as some views of truth-apt linguistic 
entities (such as propositions) are highly implausible as linguistic objects to certain philosophers and 
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Monist theories of truth differ with respect to what they identify as this truth-making 
property. Contemporary monist theories have generally come in three loosely defined 
types:  correspondence theories, coherence theories, and pragmatic theories.
7
 All 
such theories are monist theories of truth, because they take truth to be a single 
property expressed by the concept of truth, such that anything which is truth-apt is so 
in terms of the possibility of having this single property. The only way things can be 
true is to have the single property the theory equates with the property of truth, for 
example, correspondence with states of affairs, coherence with beliefs or general 
worldview, etc.
8
 
Pluralist theories of truth are not necessarily in full disagreement with monist 
theories of truth on specific properties. One of the main features of pluralist theories 
is that they hold the predicate „is true‟ expresses different properties in different 
domains or discourses (or however we define the relevant context). A pluralist might 
hold, then, that „true‟ in discussions of physics or metaphysics, for example, 
expresses a property of correspondence, while „true‟ in discussions of ethics or 
aesthetics expresses a property of coherence with other beliefs and one‟s general 
worldview.   
One important feature of pluralist theories of truth is the notion of the 
requirements particular concepts must meet in order to be a concept of truth. Pluralist 
theories are in a difficult position in some sense. They offer ways to understand the 
concept of truth, and as such purport to be offering us an explanation of a single 
concept. The concept of truth itself is not plural—there is one concept of truth-on this 
much they agree with monist theories of truth. The key to pluralist theories is that the 
single concept of truth can express different properties in different domains or 
linguistic contexts, whereas monist theories hold that the single concept expresses one 
single property in all linguistic contexts in which there are truth-apt linguistic entities. 
The monist, however, has an easy way of defining the concept of truth—as the 
concept that expresses the particular property they identify with the truth property.  
The pluralist does not have this option. Although pluralist theories need to make 
sense of the univocality of truth, they cannot do so by defining the concept of truth as 
                                                                                                                                                              
may constitute reasons against holding certain theories of truth (for example correspondence theories) 
insofar as these theories commit one to acceptance of these linguistic entities. 
7
 These are all fairly loosely defined, of course, and theories within certain categories may radically 
differ from each other, while sharing some family resemblance to other theories of its kind. Perhaps the 
least well-defined of the categories of theory mentioned here is that of pragmatic theories of truth, 
which includes anti-realist theories of a variety of kinds. 
8
 Another kind of theory of truth which will not be explicitly discussed here (mainly because none of 
the early Chinese philosophers held anything like this conception of truth) is the deflationary 
(sometimes also called disquotational) theory of truth, which denies that there is a robust property of 
truth at all, and understands truth as simply a tool for sentence evaluation that works in the way 
specified by Tarski‟s T-schema—for any sentence x, „x‟ is true iff x—where the single quoted use of x 
is an occurrence in the object language and everything else is in the metalanguage.  That is, according 
to the deflationist, there is nothing more to truth than the syntactic rules for its use described by the T-
schema (there are a number of different approaches to deflationist uses of the T-schema—see Gupta 
1993), and looking for a robust property of truth belonging to linguistic entities is fruitless. 
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the concept expressing the truth property, because there are numerous truth 
properties, dependent on context.
9
  And it doesn‟t solve the problem to think of the 
concept of truth as expressing a disjunction of all the various properties in different 
domains or contexts the truth predicate expresses (such that „x is true‟ iff x 
corresponds with states of affairs when x is a statement of physics, or x coheres with 
a general worldview when x is a statement of ethics… or…., etc). It is not, however, 
the disjunction that makes a statement of physics true, but the single property of 
correspondence. So with the disjunctive response there has been a failure to explain 
what it is about correspondence and about coherence (or whatever multiple properties 
of truth exist in the theory) have in common which make them truth properties. They 
certainly don‟t share the disjunction in common. 
There are a few different ways one might answer the objection that pluralism 
theories cannot express truth as univocal.  The different pluralist theories will turn on 
these answers. One way to make sense of the univocality of truth is to offer as a 
description of the concept of truth a set of platitudes about truth that any property 
must meet in order to count as a property of truth. In this way, we are able to have a 
univocal concept of truth, but one that will pick out a number of different properties 
in different domains or contexts, as different properties in these contexts will meet the 
requirements of the platitudes about truth. Crispin Wright famously takes this tactic, 
and offers a number of features of a truth property we might take to be platitudes 
about truth any property must meet to count as a truth property.   
Wright proposes a list of platitudes as descriptive of the concept of truth (features 
that any property must meet in order to be a truth property), including “transparency”- 
“that to assert is to present as true”, “opacity- that there are some truths we may never 
know or are incapable of coming to know”, and “correspondence”- that for a 
proposition to be true it has to (in some sense) correspond to reality.
10
 The platitudes 
Wright mentions are negotiable—as we learn more about truth and how it works in 
different domains, we may find that some of the “platitudes” are unreasonable or 
otherwise wrong, and we may discover that there are other things that should be 
added to the list of platitudes.    
Another way to capture the univocality of truth has been offered by Michael 
Lynch, who defines truth as a functional property. There is a particular property 
picked out by the predicate „is true‟ across contexts, but this property can be realized 
by different robust properties in different contexts.  This move avoids commitment to 
                                                        
9
 Although a number of pluralist theories will attempt to identify the concept of truth with a single truth 
property in order to capture univocality, this single property for the pluralist will have to be connected 
in some way to other “truth” properties within specific contexts. For Lynch, the connection is based on 
the nature of the single truth property connected with the concept of truth as a functional property, such 
that different specific properties in different contexts can play the functional role of the truth property.  
For Mou, the connection is based on the specfication of the single truth property as the thinly specified 
property of non-linguistic truth, of “the way things are.” 
10
 (Wright 2001, p. 760). Wright offers seven platitudes here, and concedes after this “the list might be 
enlarged, and some of these principles may anyway seem controversial.” He‟s not committed, that is, 
to exactly this list. Also see Wright 1992. 
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truth as a second-order property such as “the property of having a property that meets 
the truth platitudes,” which Lynch sees as problematic, and I discuss in section 3.4 
below.
11
 
Bo Mou has offered a different way to understand a pluralist concept of truth.  
According to Mou, the general thesis that truth “captures the way things are”12 can be 
represented in different ways in different “perspectives”, through elaborations within 
given perspectives that are principles (fixed to perspective) expressing this basic 
thesis, such that the nature of truth itself is represented differently in different 
perspectives, while there is still a unified conception of truth underlying all of these 
perspective-based principles.
13
 In this way, Mou offers a pluralist that attempts to 
capture the univocality of the concept of truth through a single truth property whose 
plurality is accounted for by its different representation across perspectives.   
I argue below that Wang Chong‟s conception of shi (實) as a tool for appraisal of 
teachings and linguistic entities offers us a detailed and explicitly pluralist theory of 
truth that operates differently from the three pluralist alternatives discussed above, 
although in certain key ways it is closest to Crispin Wright‟s view, as it does take the 
truth property to be a second-order property, but one based on basic facts about what 
humans do and should look for in statements, rather than on a list of platitudes 
concerning truth. While the view I will explain in the final section below may be 
thought of as simply a different way of specifying platitudes, it will turn out to be one 
that avoids some of the problems with Wright‟s view. 
 
2. SHI (實) IN ITS MEANING AS “REALITY” OR “ACTUALITY” 
 
                                                        
11
 Although in earlier work on truth as functional, Lynch accepted something like a higher order truth 
property, (see Lynch 2001), he has since modified his functionalist view such that it does not take truth 
as a higher order property. (Lynch 2009, p. 66: “truth can‟t be a second-order property…that would 
imply that truth is the property of having some property that has certain features.  But does the second-
order property itself have those features?”) He describes truth as manifested in certain contexts (or 
domains) in the following way: “Necessarily, P has the property that manifests truth for propositions of 
D if, and only if, it is a priori that, when had by atomic propositions of domain D, the truish features 
are a proper subset of M‟s features,” where „P‟ is a propositional variable, „D‟ is a domain variable, 
and „M‟ is a variable ranging over possible manifesting properties, or realizers, of truth” (Lynch 2009, 
p. 77). 
12
 (Mou 2009, p. 3). He has interestingly connected this to the concern with dao in early Chinese 
thought. In much of early Chinese philosophy, Mou claims, the basic truth thesis is understood in 
terms of capturing the dao, and different elaboration perspectives do this differently.  
13
 Mou calls this basic thesis of truth the “axiomatic thesis of the nature of truth” (ATNT), and 
formulates it thus:  “The nature of truth (of the truth bearer) consists in (the truth bearer‟s) capturing 
the way things are”  (Mou 2009, p. 3). Interestingly, one of the things Mou atttempts to capture in his 
truth pluralism is the connection between not only truth in different linguistic contexts but also 
connection between linguistic and non-linguistic truth. Wang Chong, like other early Chinese 
philosophers, had a view of truth as a property of linguistic as well as non-linguistic entities. The issue 
of non-linguistic truth has been neglected, I believe, in much contemporary work on truth, and one of 
the advantages of looking to the early Chinese philosophers, as Mou does, is to understand how we 
might think of different types of truth. 
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The term shi (實)is used in many different senses in both Pre-Han and Han literature.  
This makes it especially difficult to isolate the use connecting shi (實) to truth, and in 
particular the pluralistic conception of the concept Wang Chong held.  
The Eastern Han Shuo-Wen-Jie-Zi, compiled by Xu Shen, offers an etymology of 
shi. According to the Shuo-Wen, shi is defined as fu (富), or “fortune, wealth”. It is 
broken into the mian (宀) (“roof”) radical and beneath it the character guan (貫), 
which is explained as coins (bei 貝) strung together on a thread.14 This shows us that 
shi is understood (according to Xu‟s etymology) as the wealth contained under one‟s 
roof—what one has stored away. We can see how this conception of shi leads to a 
conception of it as both something like “actuality” (or what is the real substance of a 
situation or person—we will see this conception play a large role in what is to follow), 
and “fullness”. It is harder to see how we get from the Shuo-Wen‟s definition of shi to 
the sense of shi as “particular object” or the literal sense of “fruit” (we might wonder 
whether the literal sense of “fruit” could have been derived from seeing the fruit of a 
tree as the “fullness” or result of the full growth of the tree). 
The specific sense of shi I am most interested in for purposes of this study is the 
sense of shi as something like “reality” or “actuality”. Shi used in this way has a 
history itself. It evolved from the early uses in Pre-Qin texts
15
 to become something 
new in the Eastern Han thinkers, especially in the work of Wang Chong and later Xu 
Gan (170-217 CE). When we consider the use of shi as “actual properties” to evaluate 
sentences, as Wang often uses the term, we find that the most plausible interpretation 
of his use of shi in various linguistic contexts is as a theoretical basis for truth claims. 
If we examine the connection of the linguistic evaluative terms shi (是) and fei (非), 
as well as ran (然) and fou (否) to Wang‟s shi as “actual properties” (as I do in a 
section below), we begin to see the shape of a fairly robust theory of truth underlying 
his philosophical method and his discussion of language and the teachings of earlier 
philosophers. 
This use of shi in the sense of “substantiality” or “actuality” is a major feature in a 
number of Pre-Qin and Han works on the relationship between 名 ming, (“name”) 
and shi (實) (“actuality” or “reality”). Consideration of this issue can be found in the 
later Mohist and School of Names literature (especially in the Gongsunlongzi).  It 
became a major issue in Eastern Han thought. 
                                                        
14
 It may help to mention that this is the same guan used in the famous (or infamous, depending on 
one‟s view of its true importance) “one strand” passage of the Analects, 4.15. 
15
 There are uses of the term in the Analects, as “fullness” or “fruit” (Analects 8.5, 9.22), but the 
earliest philosophical use of the term in the Confucian texts is in the Mencius.  Mencius 4B45, for 
example, reads 言無實不祥。不祥之實，蔽賢者當之 . (“Words without shi are not auspicious.  
Inauspicious shi conceal what the sages undertake.”) Other examples of this use of shi occur at 
Mencius 4A27 and 7A37, and there is a consideration of ming-shi at 6B26.  
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One of the features of this use of shi is its reference to linguistic entities, such as 
names, rather than physical objects, as in other uses of the term.
16
 The reason that this 
term becomes linked with consideration of names (ming 名) is that it is consideration 
of shi that is connected with the appropriateness of names. Wang, as I will show 
below, thinks of shi not as primarily connected with names, but rather with sentences. 
This is why the majority of his discussions of shi are connected with yan (言 “words”, 
or “what is said”) rather than ming—Wang is attempting to make clear that the 
contents of what is said in statements
17
 (or teachings) can be shi.
18
 
John Makeham considers the correlative thought of the early Han (especially that 
of Dong Zhongshu) to be a major source of the view of shi as justifying the 
application of names to things, locating there what he calls a “correlative theory of 
naming.”19 For Dong, it is the intentions of tian (天) which justify certain names, 
rather than shi (實) (which Makeham argues is an innovation of Xu Gan‟s). In Dong‟s 
work we see a movement toward correlative theories of naming based on the 
connection between tian and names. Names, on this view, gain their applicability or 
acceptability based on their correlation with (or, one might say, correspondence with) 
certain features of the world—in Dong‟s case, features of tian.20  
I agree with Makeham that this is a major source of the transformation of the shi 
concept from that of something similar to “essence” or “substance” to a higher-order 
concept expressing actual properties of discussed entities (whether linguistic or 
otherwise). However, I do not think that Xu Gan was the first thinker to use shi as 
justificatory for naming (or the acceptability of sentences or other linguistic entities), 
or the basis for names. The earlier philosopher, Wang Chong, used shi as a way to 
evaluate linguistic entities whether (sometimes) names or (more often) sentences, 
teachings, and beliefs
21
. One of Wang Chong‟s innovations was to apply shi to a 
                                                        
16
 In much of the early literature, such as the Five Classics, shi is used with the sense of “fruit”, as it is 
in the Analects, or as “full” or “solid particular object.” 
17
 Yan is not specific enough to allow us to consider whether by it Wang means something closer to 
“sentence”, “proposition”, “utterance”, etc.  It is unclear whether it refers to what is said or the content 
of what is said, or whether Wang takes there to be such a distinction at all. It sometimes appears to 
refer to what is said, sometimes to the content of what is said, but this is consistent with a number of 
different possibilities, including that Wang saw no difference between the two uses, or that he intended 
to express different senses of yan in different contexts. For this reason, I don‟t commit to a particular 
linguistic entity as expressed by yan, and use the term „statement‟ which is comparatively neutral 
(although I realize that this term is fairly philosophically loaded as well). 
18
 The distinction between yan and ming in the Lun-Heng is clear. Yan refers to a linguistic string 
rather than to an individual word, unless the individual word serves as a statement—for example, the 
word ke 可 (“acceptable”) used as a response in the Gong-Sun-Long-Zi, can be an example of yan. 
19
 Makeham 1994, ch. 5. 
20
 specifically the 天意 tian yi, or “notions or intentions of heaven”.  Dong does use shi in connection 
with names in the Chun-Qiu-Fan-Lu, (in the Chu-Zhuang-Wang chapter, for example, he says 此聞其
名而不知其實者也 [“this is to be one who hears its name but does not know its shi”]), but his 
understanding of what shi represents seems to be based on its mirroring of tian.  
21
 One feature, and some may think, weakness, of Wang‟s account, is that he did not consider there to 
be a single underlying structure of sentences, teachings, and beliefs which make these things truth apt. 
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wider range of entities, including statements or teachings. It is the goal of what 
follows to show how Wang‟s shi operates with respect to statements, how this view 
of shi presents us with a pluralist theory of truth,
22
 and then consider how this kind of 
pluralism can both help us in the contemporary debate and in our understanding of 
ancient Chinese philosophy.   
 
3. SHI IN THE LUN-HENG—A THEORY OF ALETHIC PLURALISM 
 
3.1.  SHI AS NORMATIVELY POSITIVE PROPERTY  
 
Two essays in particular in the Lun-Heng offer us the greatest insight on Wang‟s view 
of shi as a pluralist concept of truth.  The Dui-Zuo 對作 (“Defending Creations”), and 
the Wen-Kong 問孔 (“questioning Confucius”) chapters show us how Wang uses shi 
to appraise teachings and sayings (言 yan). 
The Dui-Zuo chapter shows us shi (實) connected with the oppositions shi (是)/fei 
(非) and ran (然) (“what is the case”)/fou (否) (“what is not the case”). Shi (實) is 
contrasted with xu (虛) (“falsity”, “merely apparent properties”, “empty [talk]”).23 
The main purpose of the Dui-Zuo chapter is twofold: One purpose is to 
demonstrate that corrections dui 對 are needed to the classic texts (everything which 
has come before him) and to contemporary writings and teachings based on 
“unfounded or empty assertions” (虛言 xu yan). Wang does something similar in the 
beginning of the 問孔 Wen-Kong chapter. There he offers reasons for the “criticisms” 
of Confucius he goes on to deliver, along with a method for appraising teachings or 
                                                                                                                                                              
One of the features of contemporary analytic philosophy of language is that it has generally made a 
distinction between beliefs and teachings and what makes these things truth evaluable—most often 
sentences or propositions (depending on one‟s semantic theory). Beliefs and teachings then are truth 
apt insofar as they express propositions or sentences, which can be truth apt. My belief itself cannot be 
true, but the sentence or proposition I accept in the act of belief can be true or false, and it is in this 
sense that the belief is said to be true or false, connected to the contents of belief. There are a couple of 
reasons we generally think this needs to be done (a) teachings and beliefs, we think, are not linguistic 
entities, and thus cannot themselves be semantically evaluated, (b) in desiring or requiring truth to be 
unitary, insofar as we think there ought to be a single property of truth, we cannot make sense of two 
different types of entity, propositions or sentences as linguistic entities, and beliefs as mental entities or 
something like this, as having the same property (of truth), because we cannot explain how a single 
property could belong to things of seemingly vastly different types. If one is a certain kind of pluralist 
about truth, however (note that not all pluralists will find this acceptable), one can make sense of these 
different types of entities being truth evaluable. 
22
 I do not argue here that Wang Chong held a pluralist view very much like the worked out views of 
contemporary philosophers such as Lynch and Wright, but rather that his view of 實 shi is a kind of 
pluralism that gets its start from the same intuitions and is spelled out in a similar way to contemporary 
pluralist theories, in that multiple properties across domains or discourses can meet the concept of 
truth, and thus things can be true in different ways or senses. 
23
 Wang‟s xu is a much more complicated concept than even this jumble of translations suggests, and is 
perhaps more different from our concept of “falsehood” than shi is from “truth”. I will discuss xu in 
more detail below. 
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statements in general (which he discusses and uses in the Dui-Zuo chapter as well). 
Wang‟s other purpose in this chapter is to defend his own work insofar as it is a 
“creation” (作 zuo) rather than a “relation” or “tradition” (zhuan 專 or shu 術), and 
the usefulness of “creations” in general.24 The dominant view of the day, as Wang 
recounts in the chapter, is that only the sages were justified in creating (zuo) and that 
those who are merely worthies should concentrate on transmitting (shu) the creations 
of the sages.
25
 Wang here attempts to defend the usefulness of innovation by less than 
sagely people such as himself. Wang is basically defending himself for his 
“innovations” here, arguing that “creations” such as the Lun-Heng have become 
necessary because corrections are needed to the traditions, which have perpetuated 
falsehoods and exaggerations.  
In the Dui-Zuo chapter, because it is both a defense of Wang‟s work and an 
explanation of the efficacy of “corrections” (dui 對), there is some consideration of 
the concept of shi (實) and the related concepts of shi-fei (是非) and ran-fou (然否).  
In the early part of the chapter, Wang discusses shi (實) and explains how certain 
writings were historically necessary, due to the failure of the common people to 
recognize the truth: 
 
眾事不失實，凡論不懷亂，則桓譚之論不起。If the multitude in their works had not 
gone astray from truth (shi), and some discussions had not gone bad and become 
disordered, then Huan Tan would not have written his works (LH 84.362.15-16).
26
 
 
It is for similar reasons that Wang Chong wrote the Lun-Heng. As he explains 
near the end of the chapter: 
 
論衡九“虛”，三“增”，所以使務實誠也。In the Lun-Heng the nine chapters on 
“falsity” and three chapters on “exaggerations” are meant to create in people the 
impetus to strive for truth (實 shi) and sincerity (誠 cheng)  (LH 84.364.22). 
 
                                                        
24
 There were a number of different views on the value of creation zuo in the Pre-Qin and Han periods. 
Wang here is reacting against a particularly conservative strain of Confucianism in the Han which took 
the claim of the Analects quite literally (in Analects 7.1 Confucius says “transmit, and don‟t create” 述
而不作), that what scholars should be engaged in is transmitting (shu 述) rather than creating, and that 
even the sages did not create new things. An alternative view held by some is that only the sages can 
and are justified in creating (zuo), and that lesser persons, mere worthies such as Wang Chong cannot 
and should not attempt to create. Michael Puett explores the different attitudes on zuo before Wang‟s 
time in Puett 2001. 
25
 A view advanced by a number of Pre-Qin and Han authors, according to Puett. 
26
 All passages from the Lun-Heng follow the chapter, page, and line numbering in the Lun-Heng-Zhu-
Zi-Suo-Yin《論衡逐字索引》[Critical Essay: Concordance], Chinese University of Hong Kong 
Institute of Chinese Studies, Ancient Text Concordance Series, No. 22 (Hong Kong: The Commercial 
Press, 1996). Citation is chapter, page, line(s).  All translations from the Lun-Heng are my own, unless 
otherwise noted. 
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We see here that the critical problem Wang is trying to address is the ignorance of 
shi he thinks is endemic in his society and in the writings of contemporary scholars.   
 
3.2. XU AS ATTRACTIVE AND “MERELY APPARENT” PROPERTIES 
  
Shi is opposed with xu (虛), which is translated often as “emptiness” or “falsity”. The 
sense of xu as “false” grows out of its meaning as “empty”, and in Wang‟s writings it 
is has the sense of “merely apparent qualities.” This way of understanding xu helps us 
to make sense of passages in which Wang talks as if xu words or teachings qua xu 
words and teachings are naturally attractive. Understanding xu as “falsity” does not 
give us an explanation of the attractiveness of xu things, according to Wang. 
Statements that are simply false do not necessarily attract us, unless they have some 
other attractive features—such as making us feel better about ourselves, etc. It is not 
the falsity of certain propositions that leads us to assent to, believe in, live by, or 
otherwise adopt them, but rather some other attractive feature. With the concept xu, 
however, there does seem to be a built in attractiveness xu entities possess qua xu 
entities.  
Wang mentions the seemingly attractive features of xu entities in the Dui-Zuo 
chapter, in his discussion of shi (實).  He says of the “common people”27: 
 
俗之性，好奇怪之語，說虛妄之文。何則？實不能快意，而華虛驚耳動心也。是故
才能之士，好談論者，增益實事。  It is the nature of common people to enjoy strange 
stories and sayings, to delight in empty (xu 虛) and absurd writings. Why is this? The 
truth (shi 實) isn‟t easily [or quickly] believed, but flowery and empty speech astounds 
the hearers and excites their minds. This is why scholars with talent, who enjoy 
discussion, add things to and exaggerate the truth (shi 實) about affairs (LH 84.362.26-
363.1). 
 
Xu statements are (or at least can be) flowery, ornate, and naturally appealing to 
the “common people” (with the intimation that those of high talent will not find xu 
statements compelling). There seems to be a necessary link between xu and flowery 
statements, as the “floweriness” of xu statements serves as the reason that the 
common people tend to accept such statements. At first reading, it seems that Wang 
has failed to consider two possibilities: that there might be (1) true statements that are 
flowery; and (2) false or empty statements that are not flowery and appealing. But if 
we take Wang to be claiming that there is something inherent in xu statements that 
makes them appealing, we can show he is not making this (seemingly elementary) 
mistake. Xu statements are appealing partly because they appear to be true, even 
when “appearance” is thought of in terms of tendency to accept (something we easily 
accept may be thought to, in this way, appear to us as true). Does this mean then that 
Wang thinks of shi statements as appearing false, and thus being rejected by the 
“common people?” If we take “appearing” true as linked to appeal to imagination, or 
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 or, “simple people” (俗人 su ren). 
49 
 
Comparative Philosophy 2.1 (2011)  MCLEOD 
being “easily (or quickly) believed” (kuai yi 快意), then the fact that the truth is not 
quickly or easily believed, or is unappealing to the “common” does show that it, in a 
sense, does not appear true. Of course, it will appear true to those above the common, 
who possess some wisdom, and it is thus the responsibility of such people to write 
works promoting the truth, to stir up energy in the common people to seek the truth.  
And it can come to appear true to the common people given proper instruction by 
more wise people (such as Wang Chong and others he praises).   
Does something appear to be true simply because someone asserts it, for 
example? Think of a statement like “Confucius was 10 feet tall.” To assert this (in a 
serious way, outside contexts of joking, fiction, or semantic ascent) is to assert it as 
true, even though it is in fact false (one might be lying, ignorant, or misinformed). In 
most normal contexts, a sentence such as this would be uttered so as to inform or 
convince another person of certain features of Confucius, namely that he was 10 feet 
tall. Assertion of x is to present x as true.  It would be naïve, we might think, to take 
assertion as grounds for belief, but if we consider the normal case, this is often what 
we in fact do. We generally take a friend‟s assertion that “it is 11:30 am” or “Bill isn‟t 
here yet” or “Bill has grey hair” as acceptable grounds for assenting to the statement 
asserted. At more removed levels, we accept the assertions of experts of all kinds 
when they say things like “smoking causes cancer,” or “Jupiter‟s upper atmosphere is 
90 percent hydrogen.” The mistake common people (俗人  su ren) often make, 
according to Wang, is failure to be reflective. They accept what is asserted by people 
around them as true, even though these people are often either ignorant, misinformed, 
or dishonest. 
Xu statements, then, can be thought of as false statements that we are somehow 
inclined to believe. So why are we inclined to believe them?  Is it due to the mere fact 
of their being asserted (in the right context)? Or is there some more robust 
explanation? The above seems to suggest that there is something extra that xu 
statements have. 
Xu statements are not only ones we would be inclined to believe due to assertion, 
but they have some other compelling quality—common people delight in them and 
they appeal to the imagination. Thus, common people are more likely to imagine 
these statements as possessing the properties that would make them shi, based on 
wishful thinking. We can see how this might work. Human psychology is such that it 
is far easier to get someone to believe something they would like to be true than 
something they either have no interest in or do not want to be true. This facet of our 
psychology can be and has been used to great effect by those wishing to deceive in 
various ways.
28
 But how about in cases of ignorance or misinformation? The 
                                                        
28
 What I mention here is similar to some forms of cognitive bias, such as wishful thinking and 
confirmation bias. There are many other forms of cognitive bias as well, which shows how prone 
humans are in general to accept false statements as true even in the face of overwhelming evidence of 
their falsity. This is very much Wang‟s worry.  In fact many of the problems with the beliefs of su ren 
he mentions in the Lun-Heng line up with a number of cognitive biases contemporary behavioral 
psychologists discuss. He most vehemently heaps scorn upon wishful thinking, which he isolates as a 
particularly pressing problem among common people in his time. 
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statement “Bill is 6 feet tall” may be false, and I may believe and thus assert this 
statement, to inform a friend about features of Bill. I may have been misinformed, 
however, having never met Bill. In fact, say, Bill is only 5 feet 7 inches tall. There is 
nothing intrinsically compelling, beyond my assertion, about the statement “Bill is 6 
feet tall.” This is not something we would expect to “appeal to the imagination” or be 
believed due to a human inclination to accept the fantastic. Rather, it will generally be 
accepted because I assert it and the listener has no reason to doubt that what I say in 
such cases is true.  So is this statement xu?   
For Wang, statements of this kind are not xu. There are statements, like my 
example of “Bill is 6 feet tall,” that are not-shi but are also not-xu. The reason Wang 
does not speak about this kind of statement is that he is mainly concerned with xu 
statements as compelling to su ren. Xu statements are most problematic.  We can and 
do easily correct our mistakes when they involve things that we have no general 
inclination to accept. My friend might believe me that Bill is 6 feet tall, but when he 
gets different information from someone else, he will likely come to doubt what I told 
him, and remain agnostic about Bill‟s height until meeting him. However, xu 
statements are much trickier than this because cognitive bias is involved. We are 
hesitant to give up belief in statements we would like to be true, for example, and 
often hold to them even in the face of overwhelming evidence that they are false.    
Shi 實 , as the opposite of xu, is being used to flag actual properties (the actual 
possession of the properties we seek when appraising statements) as opposed to 
merely apparent properties (the mere apparent possession of these properties) of 
statements, teachings, or whatever can be shi-apt. To see what these properties are, 
we have to look to Wang‟s discussion surrounding concepts related to shi and xu. 
 
3.3.  MORAL NORMATIVITY 
In the Dui-Zuo chapter there are two dichotomies discussed in relation with shi and 
xu—namely shi-fei (是非) and ran-fou (然否). In the Dui-Zuo chapter, shi (是) and 
fei (非)  when discussed as concepts rather than verbally used, seem to be connected 
to ethical or normative contexts. Alfred Forke, in his translation, noticed this and 
translated shi (是 ) and fei (非 ) in the Dui-Zuo chapter as “right” and “wrong” 
respectively, in all the places where they are discussed as evaluative properties.  We 
see shi and fei mentioned along with ran and fou, “is the case” and “is not the case” in 
discussions of shi (實) in the chapter. Two passages in particular show us the two 
dichotomies discussed together: 
 
明辯然否，病心傷之，安能不論？  … ［孟子］引平直說，褒是抑非。  
Those who can determine what is the case and what is not the case feel an ailment 
in their hearts which pain them [at the thought of truth being subverted by the 
“common people” and flowery scholarship] … [Mencius‟] language was straight 
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and to the point, according high place to the right (是 shi) and suppressing the 
wrong (非 fei)  (LH 84.363.3-5).29 
 
One may find it curious that shi and fei are translated here as “right” and “wrong”, 
which suggest moral normativity, while ran and fou are translated in more clearly 
truth-evaluative terms as “what is the case” and “what is not the case”. What is the 
justification for the difference? Are we given any reason to read shi and fei as I do in 
the above passage? A consideration of some other instances of shi and fei in this 
chapter may help. The following passage is crucial for understanding the normative 
use, as well as for understanding how Wang may be seen as a pluralist about truth. 
 
況論衡細說微論，解釋世俗之疑，辯照是非之理，使後進曉見然否之分。The Lun-
Heng uses precise language and detailed discussion, to reveal and explain the doubts of 
this generation of common people, to bring to light through debate right and wrong 
principles (是非之理 shi fei zhi li), and to help those who come later clearly see the 
difference between what is the case and what is not the case  (LH 84.364.10-11).
30
 
 
Here, we see shi and fei connected to the “principles” (li 理) Wang aims to 
uncover. His purpose in the Lun-Heng is to reveal shi and fei principles and to help 
people distinguish between what is the case and what is not the case. What is the 
reason for using of two different formulations here, shi-fei and ran-fou, if he means 
something like “truth and falsity” in both cases? It is implausible that this should be 
seen as simply using synonyms to mean something like “truth and falsity”, so that he 
is saying that he wants to (1) uncover true and false principles, and (2) help people 
distinguish between what is true and false.  This point is strengthened by his use of li 
(理), by which Wang means something like “moral principle.” This is far from the 
Song Neo-Confucian use of li (理) to express a foundational metaphysical concept. 
The above mentioned is the only occurrence of li in the Dui-Zuo chapter, but if we 
look to the Wen-Kong (“Questioning Confucius”) chapter, in which consideration of 
argument and method is a central theme
31
, we learn more about how Wang uses li. 
 
難  孔子，何傷於義？誠有傳聖業之知，伐孔子之說，何逆於理？  … [if we] 
challenge Confucius, how is this injurious to moral appropriateness? If, sincerely 
                                                        
29
 It is useful here to consider Forke‟s translation as well, which, like my own, uses “right” and 
“wrong” for 是 shi and 非 fei:  “He who knows how to discriminate between truth (ran) and falsehood 
(fou), must feel a pang at it; why should he not speak? … [Mencius] used plain and straightforward 
language to recommend what was right, and to reject what was wrong.” 
30
 Forke reads the shi in the final part of this passage as causally connected to bringing light to right 
and wrong principle—he translates: “… intended to explain the right and wrong principles so that 
future generations can clearly see the difference between truth and falsehood.” (Forke 1907, p. 88) 
31
 This is somewhat contentious. Michael Nylan argues (Nylan 1996) that Wang‟s purpose in the Wen-
Kong chapter was to show Confucius an ultimately unsuccessful teacher, while I argue (McLeod 2007) 
that Wang‟s purpose in Wen-Kong was primarily methodological rather than critical. 
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attempting to transmit the knowledge of the sages‟ teachings, one attacks Confucius‟ 
words, how does this oppose principle (li)?  (LH 28.122.7) 
 
This is clearly a view of li as either the collection of moral norms or the ground of 
moral norms. Wang‟s second sentence is explaining his first. Challenging (難 nan) 
Confucius is not injurious to moral appropriateness (義  yi), because attacking 
Confucius‟ words in order to clear things up does not violate the correct moral 
principles that make certain acts appropriate or inappropriate. This is also argued in 
another passage in the Wen-Kong chapter, 
32
 in which Wang criticizes Confucius for 
violating li by picking on the weaknesses of Meng Yizi and thus acting “contrary to 
the will of the Duke of Zhou” (違周公之志). 
If we take these uses of li to be the same as that in the above passage from the 
Dui-Zuo chapter, then it looks like the passage gives us two separate goals of the Lun-
Heng—a moral goal, uncovering true moral principles, and a non-moral goal, of 
determining what is the case and what is not the case. Now, the question becomes, 
why distinguish the two? Wouldn‟t simply “discovering the truth” take care of both 
of these? Why didn‟t Wang simply say that the purpose of the Lun-Heng is to 
uncover the truth, to help us distinguish between shi 實 and xu 虛, which seems his 
main purpose as he describes it in other passages? If he is after truth, after all, then it 
looks like facts about moral principles and what is the case will just fall out of this 
pursuit. If we know what is true, then by definition we will know which moral 
principles, if any, are right, because we will know whether normative statements, 
such as “one should never pick on the weaknesses of another,” are true.  
There seems to be some connection between fou-ran and shi-fei in LH 84.363.3-5 
above, where Wang talks about Mencius‟ ability and action. According to this 
passage, those who have the ability to discriminate between what is the case and what 
is not the case (ran and fou) are able to use language to point out what is right (是 shi) 
and what is wrong (非 fei). So knowledge of moral principle does seem to follow 
from ability to discriminate between what is and what is not the case. Does this, 
however, show us that there is a single property of truth, such as ran (what is the case) 
operative in all contexts? A consideration of shi (實) shows us that it is the wise 
person‟s grasp of shi (實) that enables him to both distinguish between what is and 
what is not the case and to distinguish between right and wrong moral principles. It is 
not, that is, ability to distinguish between ran and fou which makes one able to 
distinguish between shi and fei, but rather the ability to distinguish between shi (實) 
and xu (虛) which makes one able to make both of the other types of discrimination. 
The fact that Mencius had the ability to distinguish between ran and fou showed that 
he had the ability on which the ability to distinguish between shi (是) and fei (非) 
rests. 
The ability to distinguish between 實 shi and 虛 xu then presumes the ability to 
make a number of other useful discriminations involving teachings, statements, and 
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 LH 28.123.1 
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other entities. Shi and xu, that is, seem like higher-order concepts, unlike ran and fou 
or shi and fei. I believe the best way to make sense of this is to take 是 shi and 然 ran 
as ways in which something can be 實 shi (“actual”, “true”), while 非 fei and 否 fou 
are ways in which something can be 虛 xu (“empty”, “false”, “only apparently true”). 
That is, Wang is offering a view of 實 shi in which what makes a statement (言 yan) 
實 shi is either being 是 shi, or being 然 ran. 
A moral principle, such as mentioned in the above case: “don‟t attack people‟s 
weaknesses” can be 是 shi or 非 fei, but we can clearly see (we would share Wang‟s 
intuition) that phrased in this way, it cannot be “the case” or “not the case”, because it 
is not an assertion about a state of affairs. We could reformulate this so it would look 
like an assertion about a state of affairs, and render it this way: “one should not attack 
people‟s weaknesses.” This formulation seems “is the case”-apt, as it is formulated in 
such a way as to suggest the possibility of a state-of-affairs that makes it the case that 
one should (or should not) attack people‟s weaknesses, whether we understand this 
state-of-affairs to involve moral facts (whatever these are), teleological features of 
humans, or anything else that could belong to a state-of-affairs of the world and also 
explain the normativity involved in this principle. 
Wang, however, does not evaluate moral principles in this way, in terms of states-
of-affairs. He considers statements like “don‟t attack people‟s weaknesses” and their 
acceptability in terms of 是 shi and 非 fei, “right” and “wrong”. If normativity in 
moral cases is basic on Wang‟s view, and not based on facts about “what is the case”, 
we can explain easily why Wang distinguished 實 shi-making properties for moral 
statements from 實 shi-making properties for non-moral statements. There are simply 
different properties which make these different kinds of statements or teachings 實 shi 
(true, actual). And if this is the case, then Wang can be seen as a pluralist about 實 shi, 
in a way similar to contemporary alethic pluralist theorists about “truth”.33 
  
3.4. UNIVOCALITY AND THE USEFULNESS OF WANG‟S THEORY OF   
TRUTH 
                                                        
33
 Special thanks are due to a reviewer of this article who correctly points out that the evidence I have 
offered here is not by itself conclusive to show that Wang held a pluralist theory of truth, especially 
one using the terminology and concepts of contemporary analytic philosophy. Although Wang perhaps 
did not explicitly have a pluralist view like the one I sketch below, I think this theory is the best way to 
make sense of what Wang says in the Lun-Heng concerning shi, as it makes his position strongest, 
even though what he says is also compatible with a number of other interpretations, including the 
possibility that the differences between evaluative terms in different contexts were merely stylistic. 
Although I import the conceptual apparatus of contemporary analytic philosophy to reconstruct 
Wang‟s view of truth, I realize that this distorts Wang‟s view to the extent that Wang did not work 
with such a conceptual apparatus. Much of what follows below is my attempt to reconstruct Wang‟s 
basic view of truth and extend it using the tools available to contemporary philosophy. Thus, much of 
what follows is not explicitly held by Wang, but rather is a natural way of developing his pluralist view 
of truth. As such, it can be seen as continuous with Wang‟s theory of truth, even if it is less useful for 
understanding the way early Chinese thinkers theorized about truth (although the general pluralism I 
attribute to Wang above can, I think, be useful for this latter project as well). 
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Which properties then are expressed by 實 shi? Moral acceptability (是 shi) is one 
property expressed by 實 shi, in the moral domain. This property of acceptability 
would not, however, make non-moral statements about physical objects true. This 
property can only be a shi-making property in the appropriate domain. Non-moral 
statements cannot be 是 shi, just as moral principles cannot be 然 ran.34   
At least one difficult problem remains, however. One key feature of the concept 
of truth, or the concept of 實 shi, is that it should be a univocal concept. Even though 
there might be different properties in different linguistic contexts that make a 
statement true, it can not be the case that “truth” (or 實 shi) means different things in 
different contexts. It should mean the same thing to say that a moral statement is true 
as it does to say that a non-moral statement is true. As I‟ve shown in the previous 
section, one way of capturing this is to define the concept of truth by way of a number 
of platitudes that any property in any relevant domain must meet in order to be a truth 
property. Thus, the meaning of „truth‟ can be understood in terms of the platitudes, 
while the properties the concept expresses are variable in different contexts. Wang 
Chong, however, does not seem aware of either this problem of univocality or the 
conception of fixing the meaning of truth via platitudes. Shouldn‟t this lead us to 
question whether Wang actually did have a pluralist view of truth? 
I think that the question of how to account for the univocality of shi did not arise 
for Wang due to his conception of what the property of 實 shi is, and how it relates to 
the “truthmaking” properties 是 shi and 然 ran. On Wang‟s view of 實 shi, there is no 
difficulty in accounting for univocality, because the concept of shi is of a unified 
second-order property linked to particular truthmaking properties that differ by 
context. 
We find passages in the Lun-Heng that show us that Wang did think of shi as 
univocal. The following passage from the Dui-Zuo chapter is informative here: 
 
人君遭弊，改教於上； 君臣（愚）惑，作論於下。［下］實得，則上教從矣。冀
悟迷惑之心，使知虛實之分。實虛之分定，而華僞之文滅；華僞之文滅，則純誠之
化日以孳矣。 When the ruler does badly, instruction to change conduct is directed 
toward the person on high. When the ruler‟s subjects are doltish, engaging in discussions 
is directed toward the people below. When the people below obtain the truth (實 shi), 
then instruction of the person on high follows. I hope to stir some of these minds, to help 
them distinguish between truth (實 shi) and falsity (虛 xu). Once the distinction between 
truth and falsity is established, then flowery and artificial writings can be eliminated.  
When flowery and artificial writings are eliminated, pure and sincere transformations 
will grow more abundant day by day  (LH 84.363.12-14). 
 
                                                        
34
 This seems to mesh with our own intuitions if we consider sentences like “don‟t attack people‟s 
weaknesses.” It seems to make no sense to say that this can be the case or not be the case, whether or 
not a reformulation as described above will give us a sentence that can be the case or not be the case. 
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In this passage, we see that the ability to distinguish between shi and xu leads to 
transformation of conduct as well as the elimination of error in writings. Since much 
of Wang‟s criticism in the Lun-Heng is directed at physical and metaphysical as well 
as moral writings, we can see this second ability as reaching both moral and non-
moral domains or contexts. Wang also asserts a connection between elimination of 
false (虛 xu) writings and moral transformation (we have to assume this is what he 
means here by 化 hua, as the passage began by speaking of conduct and this should 
be taken to point back to that). We see again that the ability to discriminate between 
實 shi and 虛 xu allows us to both distinguish between 然 ran and 否 fou and to 
distinguish between 是 shi and 非 fei. In order for this to be the case, there must be 
some univocal concept of 實 shi that captures the similarities between the various 
properties which count as shi-properties.  
Although it is difficult to completely demonstrate the case based on what Wang 
says in the Lun-Heng, I suggest that the view I outline below on the univocality of shi 
is most like the one Wang held. It explains why he didn‟t see a problem with 
maintaining its univocality while maintaining pluralism. In addition, the view I 
attribute to Wang here can, I think, offer us an alternative way to solve some of the 
problems raised for pluralist theories. 
The univocality of shi is based on its second-order status. Shi, for Wang, is the 
property of having properties that we actually do and should seek when we appraise 
statements. There are a number of parts of his analysis of shi. First, it is a second-
order property, but a second order pluralistic property. It is not “the property of 
having some (one) property such that [the truth-making description is met],” (as both 
Lynch and Wright specify the second-order view
35), but rather it is “the property of 
having properties such that [the truth-making description is met].” This move actually 
has a great deal of philosophical payoff, in that it removes the force of objections to 
pluralism based on the problem of mixed conjunctions, as I explain below.   
Shi, for Wang, can be thought of as expressing a second-order property—the 
property of having a property or properties that we should and do seek when 
appraising statements. This makes truth rest on normativity. The normativity involved 
here, however, is basic, in a sense that what we should do is linked with what we do 
in fact do, but is not explained by the fact that we do these things. That is, the 
descriptive element is not meant to explain the normative, but be a further basic fact 
beside it. Here, both concepts are in the employ of the truth function, as an 
explanation for what makes a particular statement shi. If we consider the properties of 
然 ran and 是 shi that can belong to statements in the non-moral and moral domains, 
respectively, we can begin to see what is meant. The properties of ran and shi are 
properties humans naturally seek when they appraise sentences, according to Wang. 
No one accepts as true a statement they believe to be 不然 bu ran or 非 fei. Rather, 
the reason a statement is accepted by anyone is because one believes (sometimes 
                                                        
35
 Although Lynch rejects a second-order property view of truth, in part due to the difficulties 
discussed below. 
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mistakenly) that this statement is either 然 ran, 是 shi, or has some other 實 shi-
making property. It is a brute fact about humans that we do seek properties such as 是 
shi and 然 ran when we appraise sentences and accept or believe statements based on 
whether or not we have reason to think they are ran or shi. Thus the key question to 
be answered when we consider whether or not something is 實 shi is whether the 
statement actually has the properties we naturally seek. In addition to this description 
of what humans actually do, however, there is an added normative element. Not only 
do we seek properties like 然 ran and 是 shi, but we ought to seek such properties. 
Why ought we? That is, what explains the normativity? I believe (though it would 
take much more space than I have here to argue) that Wang takes this normativity as 
explanatorily basic. Although this certainly would strike most of us in the 
contemporary western-based philosophical tradition as strange or implausible, this 
view (if Wang‟s own) would not, by any means, have been unprecedented in ancient 
China. The Mohists give us the best example of a group of thinkers who may have 
had a similar view of certain normative statements as basic. 
Wang‟s view of the univocality of shi has a couple of interesting features, relevant 
to the contemporary debate surrounding pluralism and truth in general. It is 
sometimes objected that pluralism cannot account for the truth of statements or 
propositions that are conjunctions of propositions belonging to different linguistic 
domains. The reason for this, in general, is that on most pluralist theories, there are 
particular properties in particular domains that play the truth role. For example, say 
that in non-moral contexts, correspondence plays the truth role, while in moral and 
aesthetic contexts something like coherence plays the truth role. There then becomes 
a problem in giving an account of what plays the truth role for propositions 
containing both non-moral and moral or aesthetic conjuncts. 
Wang‟s theory of shi has an easy solution to this problem. In fact, we might think 
that one of the reasons that the problem never occurred to Wang is that it could never 
have gained traction given his particular view of shi. Because a statement is shi just in 
case it has the properties we do and should seek when appraising sentences, it is not 
necessary for there to be only one particular property playing the truth role for a given 
statement. The necessity of there being one truth-making property for any given 
statement or proposition, I contend, is what gets the pluralist into the problem. 
However, if „is true‟ expresses a unique truth property that is linked (in virtue of 
being a second order property) to the lower level “truth properties”, there is no need 
to rely on only one property to play the truth-making role. Lynch‟s theory does 
require a single property to play the truth role for any given proposition, because of 
his functionalist theory, and Wright appears to need it as well, because he specifies 
the higher order property as being linked to the (single) property that meets the 
platitudes in a given domain. The truth property can be defined differently, however, 
so as not to link it to a single truth-making property that must belong to a statement 
for it to be true. If a statement is true when it has properties we do and should seek, it 
is not necessary for a mixed conjunction to have a single lower-level property that 
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makes it true. It is enough that both conjuncts are true by virtue of having properties 
we do and should seek. 
Consider the following mixed conjunction: 
“Mars is the 4th closest planet to the sun and murder is wrong.” 
Wang can account for the truth (實 shi) of this statement by analysis of the 
properties of the logical parts, here the conjuncts. If each of the conjuncts has lower-
level properties we do and should seek and on the basis of which we do and should 
accept statements, then the conjunction is 實 shi. And there is no difficulty here, 
because the two conjuncts are true in exactly the same way—that is, they both 
possess properties we do and should seek, and thus the entire statement possesses 
these properties. Note that the entire statement does not possess both ran and shi (the 
moral conjunct does not possess the property of ran, for example), but the entire 
statement does possess the second-order property of 實 shi in virtue of the possession 
of each conjunct of properties we do and should seek. We can explain this ultimately 
in terms of the properties at the lowest level, in this case 然 ran and 是 shi, but we 
can construct ever higher levels in the theory of 實 shi. Thus, the above statement is 
實 shi in virtue of having shi-making properties (然 ran and 是 shi), and the conjuncts 
considered separately are 實 shi in virtue of having 然 ran (in the first conjunct) and 
是 shi (in the second). We can see here that refraining from tying the truth property to 
a single truth-making lower level property has enormous advantages over the 
properties defined by Wright and Lynch.      
So what of another objection made to the view of the truth property as a second-
order property, which Lynch raises against Wright‟s second order view of truth? If 
the second-order property obtains in virtue of a proposition‟s meeting the various 
platitudes for truth, then it looks like the truth property itself doesn‟t meet the 
platitudes for truth.  Thus, the second-order property does not itself qualify as a truth 
property under the definition of truth properties on Wright‟s account. 36  Wang 
Chong‟s account of shi does not have this problem. Although it is a second-order 
property, unlike Wright‟s truth property it does itself qualify as a truth property under 
the conceptual description of truth (shi).   
The property expressed by shi is the property of (actually) having properties that 
we do and should seek when appraising statements. Does this property itself meet the 
                                                        
36
 Lynch 2009, p. 64-65: “Wright is barred from identifying even this wafer‐thin property—the 
property of having a property that satisfies the platitudes or falls under the concept of truth—with the, 
or even “a” property of truth. For the property of having a property that falls under the descriptive 
concept of truth, doesn't itself fall under that description. Again, that description consists, essentially, 
in a list of the platitudes that a property must satisfy. But is the property of having a property that, e.g., 
is distinct from warrant, possessed by asserted propositions, is objective, and so on a property with all 
those features? No. It is the property of having a property with those features. Hence a view like 
Wright's which identifies truth with whatever property satisfies the platitudes in a particular domain 
must hold that the second‐order property of having a property that plays that role is distinct from truth: 
call it truth*. And this in turn makes it hard to see how reductive pluralism solves the problem of 
mixed inferences and associated problems. For while she can say that there is a property preserved by 
valid mixed inferences, that property is truth*, not truth.” 
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criteria for being shi? That is, is this property something that we do and should seek 
when appraising statements? It is. But notice that we will only be concerned about 
whether or not shi obtains when there is semantic ascent, or some question as to 
whether a certain statement does actually or does not have the lower-level properties 
we seek when appraising statements. Consider the statement: 
“One should imitate the actions of the Zhou kings.”   
This statement may be 實 shi by virtue of having the property of 是 shi (right). So 
there are two relevant properties here—實 shi (true) and 是 shi (right). 實 Shi is the 
second order property. So, are we looking for that when we appraise this sentence? In 
a sense we are—we are looking for both. The second order property is especially 
relevant when we engage in semantic ascent. Consider the statement: 
“The statement „you should imitate the actions of the Zhou kings‟ is true (實 
shi).”   
What property or properties do we and should we seek when appraising this 
sentence? Now that we have semantically ascended, the lowest level properties such 
as 然 ran and 是 shi will be out of the immediate picture, and the sentence must be 
appraised to see if it has the property of 實 shi. What we ought to and will seek here 
is the second order property itself, because the possession of this will tell us whether 
the relevant statement is true. Thus, the relevant properties of this statement are the 
original property of 是 shi (right), which makes the second order property of 實 shi 
obtain, and a third-order 實 shi property along side of that. 
So the question of whether the second (and higher) order property of shi can be 
something itself that counts as a truth property under the given definition of truth can 
be answered in the affirmative.
37
 The definition of truth given here does not bar 
                                                        
37
 There may be some worry here that the property of 實 shi belonging to mixed conjunctions (pre-
ascent) will be third-order properties rather than second-order properties. If we take the shi-ness of the 
full conjunction as a function of the shi-ness of the conjuncts, this will necessarily be the case. 
However, I do not believe this is the right way to see shi in cases of conjunctions, or any statement.  
What I propose here goes beyond anything Wang says, of course, and is meant as simply a way of 
making sense of how shi is a second-order property even in cases of mixed conjunctions. Since shi is 
an appraisal term—it is a property that belongs to a statement if and only if that statement has the 
properties we do and should seek in appraising statements—it need only apply to appraised statements. 
That is, shi might be understood as a tag telling us whether a statement has the desired properties or 
not. It need not be the case, if we are appraising a conjunction, that the conjunction is shi based on 
each of the conjuncts being shi, even if those conjuncts would be shi if appraised individually. The 
reason shi can work like this is that it is based on human goals—what we do and ought to seek. Thus, 
independently of our appraisal of a particular statement, there do not have to be shi-facts about it. 
Thus, a mixed conjunction can have the second-order property of shi based on having the property of 
ran and shi in its conjuncts, without being based on having the individual property shi of each 
conjunct. However, if we appraise the conjuncts separately as individual statements, we can also take 
them as having the property of shi, based on the lower-level properties each possess. As I say above, 
this explanation goes well beyond anything we can find in Wang Chong, but I believe this addition 
keeps with Wang‟s general view of shi, and gives us a way to better understand how a shi property like 
Wang‟s can work. 
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higher-order properties constructed in this way from serving as truth-making 
properties. 
So we have seen that Wang can offer us a way of understanding how the predicate 
„is true‟ can express a unique, second-order property, while avoiding some problems 
for such views. Of course, accepting something like Wang‟s view depends on how far 
we‟re willing to go with him on the explanatory basic quality of descriptive and 
normative facts about human behavior. We might part ways with Wang at a number 
of different points—whether it has to do with our objection to holding truth to be that 
closely linked with human behavior (is this a radical anti-realism?), whether it has to 
do with our resistance to accepting as basic the kinds of facts Wang does, or whether 
it has to do with issues of possible vicious circularity in the definition of 實 shi. All of 
these issues, of course, remain to be worked out. But if they can be satisfactorily 
worked out, we have a ready made way to answer objections to pluralist theories of 
truth as well as a way to offer better explanations for certain key features of truth that 
any theory, pluralist or monist, must account for.  
In addition to helping in the contemporary debate surrounding truth and pluralism, 
Wang‟s pluralist view of shi, focusing as it does on the distinction between moral and 
non-moral statements, also might help us to understand the concept of truth in early 
Chinese philosophy in general. Although the particular formulation of a pluralist 
theory of truth using shi as the truth concept is new to Wang, implicitly pluralist 
theories of truth in China in general do not begin with Wang Chong. Pluralist 
intuitions about truth can be found as early as the Mo-Zi. The best way to understand 
the seeming switch between pragmatic-sounding arguments and correspondence 
based reasoning in the Mo-Zi can be explained by attributing a pluralist conception of 
truth to the author(s) of the text. This conception is not fleshed out in early texts such 
as the Mo-Zi, however. I also suspect that this incipient pluralism about truth is at the 
heart of the “paradoxes” of the Gong-Sun-Long-Zi. Gong Sun Long is, I believe, 
noticing an intuitive difficulty with pluralist theories of truth that arises when we have 
defined no univocal concept of truth that captures the different truth-making 
properties. With Wang‟s more worked out (although not fully worked out) conception 
of shi as truth, we can look backward to come to a better understanding of the 
incipient pluralism in earlier thinkers. In this sense, understanding Wang‟s theory of 
shi can help us to understand truth in early China in general. Of course, the tie 
between Wang‟s theory and those of his predecessors will have to be developed in 
future work. 
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